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I. INTRODUCTION
S ECTION 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act permits the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission to promulgate rules to prohibit "any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance."' The SEC effectuated
the intent of that section by adopting rule 10b-5.2
The Rule is the most powerful and most widely-used tool in the
federal arsenal of securities remedies. It prohibits a wide variety of
conduct in many areas, including those of broker-dealers' activities,'
* Member of the New York Bar. B.M.E. 1961, M.B.A. 1963, LL.B. 1964, Cornell Uni-
versity.
The author gratefully acknowledges the invaluable substantive suggestions of Ed Kauf-
mann and Fredric J. Klink, members of the New York Bar, the editorial aid of Ellen K.
Jacobs and Ann S. Kheel, and the stenographic help of Mary Ann Assicurato.
1. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970) (emphasis added)
[hereinafter cited by section as 1934 Act].
2. The text of rule 10b-5 [hereinafter cited as "the Rule" or "10b-"] is as follows:
"It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national
securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate
as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security." 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-6 (1973).
3. See Jacobs, The Impact of Securities Exchange Act Rule 10b-5 on Broker-Dealers, 57
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manipulation,4 mismanagement,5 exchange offers and tender offers, and
tipping of inside information. But by far the majority of 10b-5 cases
arises under a sixth category-misrepresentations and omissions.
To state a 10b-5 cause of action, a successful plaintiff must demon-
strate, among other things, that a statement or omission is misleading.'
The question of when an assertion or omission is misleading is the topic
of this article.
Of 10b-5's three clauses, the second is on its face the most germane.
It declares that it is unlawful
To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading. .... 7
Although clauses (a) and (c) may seem less relevant, they also play an
important role in the determination of misrepresentations and omissions.
Courts do not rely strictly on the wording of the three clauses to
ascertain the Rule's outer limits. Nevertheless, the word "untrue" in
clause (b) could be considered narrower than the phrase "false or mis-
leading" found in some other 1934 Act provisions.8 The difference is
more apparent than real however,' and in any event clauses (a) and (c)
are broad enough to remedy any shortcoming in clause (b) arising from
the absence of the phrase "false or misleading." Therefore, cases arising
under remedies granted by other securities acts are persuasive authority
with regard to whether or not the plaintiff was misled.
The Rule prohibits misrepresentations, half-truths, omissions, and con-
cealments of after-acquired information. 0 Deception may be accom-
plished either by words or by nonverbal conduct.1
Cornell L. Rev. 869, 871 & n.8 (1972); Comment, Broker Silence and Rule 10b-5: Expand-
ing the Duty to Disclose, 71 Yale L.J. 736 (1962).
4. See Jacobs, Regulation of Manipulation by SEC Rule 10b-5, 18 N.Y.L.F. 511 (1973).
5. See Jacobs, The Role of SEC Rule 10b-5 in the Regulation of Mismanagement, 59
Cornell L. Rev. 27 (1973).
6. As to the other elements of a 10b-5 action generally, see 3A H. Bloomenthal, Secu-
rities and Federal Corporate Law § 9.21 (1972).
7. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (1973).
8. The "false or misleading" wording is used, for example, in 1934 Act §§ 9(a) (4) &
18(a), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(a) (4) & 78r(a) (1970).
9. In practice, the courts have drawn no distinction between the two formulations. But
see Gould v. American Hawaiian S.S. Co., 319 F. Supp. 795, 801-02 (D. Del. 1970).
10. Misrepresentations and omissions are the most common 10b-5 violations. SEC v.
National Bankers Life Ins. Co., 324 F. Supp. 189, 195 (N.D. Tex.), aff'd, 448 F.2d 652
(5th Cir. 1971).
11. For examples of nonverbal violations see Carroll v. First Nat'l Bank, 413 F.2d 353
(7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1003 (1970); Brennan v. Midwestern United Life
Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. Ind. 1966), trial on the merits, 286 F. Supp. 702 (N.D.
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A misrepresentation is defined as a statement which conveys a false
impression to a reasonable investor.12
A half-truth is a statement which accurately discloses some facts but
misleads the listener or reader by concealing other data necessary for a
true understanding. One example of a half-truth is a statement that the
value of a company's inventory increased without disclosure that the
increase arose from an arbitrary revaluation.13 Half-truths are, perforce,
usually more difficult to detect than outright lies.14
Clause (b) of the Rule prohibits both misrepresentations and half-
truths, but it alone may not reach the third category, complete silence.
However, clauses (a) and (c) have been interpreted to proscribe com-
plete silence when there is a duty to disclose. 5 When this duty does
exist, a plaintiff would be misled by defendant's failure to reveal facts
of which plaintiff was unaware. The principal applications of the silence
Ind. 1968), aff'd, 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 US. 989 (1970); Coch-
ran v. Channing Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239, 241-43 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); Pro Rata Stock Dis-
tributions to Shareholders, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9618 (June 1, 1972),
4 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ff 72,146.
12. See generally notes 22-30 infra and accompanying text regarding the definition of
"misleading." Numerous cases have held that misrepresentations are actionable. See cases
cited in Part II infra.
13. Bowman & Bourdon, Inc. v. Rohr, 296 F. Supp. 847, 851 (D. M1ass.), aff'd per
curiam, 417 F.2d 780 (1st Cir. 1969). A small sampling of other half-truth cases would
include SEC v. North Am. Research & Dev. Corp., 424 F.2d 63, 77 (2d Cir. 1970); SEC
v. Great Am. Indus., Inc., 407 F.2d 453, 461 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 920
(1969); Butler Aviation Int'l, Inc. v. Comprehensive Designers, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 910,
913-14 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd, 425 F.2d 842 (2d Cir. 1970); Trussell v. United Under-
writers, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757, 762, 773 (D. Colo. 1964); Meisel v. North Jersey Trust
Co., 218 F. Supp. 274, 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Cochran v. Channing Corp, 211 F. Supp. 239,
243 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). The concept of half-truth has also been expanded to include failure
to correct a misleading impression the defendant knew plaintiff received from another
party. Moerman v. Zipco, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 439, 446 (E.D.N.Y. 1969), alfPd per curiam,
422 F.2d 871 (2d Cir. 1970).
The Commission has taken the concept a step further by "urging" reporting of an ad-
verse development when favorable information is made public, even though the two items
are not related. Comment on Timely Disclosure of Material Corporate Developments, SEC
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8995 (Oct. 15, 1970), [1970-1971 Transfer Binder]
CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ff 77,915.
14. Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 298 F. Supp. 66, 95 (E.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd, 478
F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1973).
15. Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 733 & n.6 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951
(1968); List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 461-62 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
811 (1965); SEC v. Crofters, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 236, 255 (S.D. Ohio 1972); Trussell v.
United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757, 762 (D. Colo. 1964); Meisel v. North Jersey
Trust Co., 218 F. Supp. 274, 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Cochran v. Channing Corp., 211 F.
Supp. 239, 243 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 913 & n.20 (1961).
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prohibition are to transactions in the over-the-counter market or on a
national securities exchange, but, theoretically, it could also pertain
when a trade is made in a face-to-face meeting.
The final type of misleading activity is the concealing of after-
acquired information which indicates that a statement previously made
was misleading. Certified independent public accountants have a duty to
disclose after-acquired information, 0 and issuers also may have this
obligation.'"
II. GENERAL RULES
The Rule prohibits a wide variety of misleading written and oral
statements.' s The same standard for determining whether a statement
is misleading is not applied to all types of statements; for example,
courts tolerate a lower standard of accuracy for (and hence do not
condemn as quickly) misstatements or half-truths in shorter, less formal
statements prepared under the exigencies of time pressure.' 9 Thus, proxy
statements and registration statements are usually viewed with a more
16. Note, Accountants' Liability for Nondisclosure of After-Acquired Information: Strict
Liability Under Rule 10b-5?, 22 Rutgers L. Rev. 554, 568-69, 576-77 (1968) (discussing
in particular Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1967)).
17. See Note, supra note 16, at 579-80; note 230 infra and accompanying text.
18. In discussing the standards for misleading statements, no distinction Is drawn be-
tween oral and written representations since the same rules apply. Oral statements can be
classified as either formal or informal, depending upon the circumstances, although they
would usually be informal.
The majority of the text is directed to misrepresentations and half-truths, but the same
principles apply to silence and concealment of after-acquired information. In addition, the
concepts of whether a statement is misleading and of when a fact is material are some-
times confused but are nevertheless distinct questions. Some of the authorities mentioned
here in the discussion of misleading statements also consider the concept of materiality at
the same time.
19. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 362 n.14 (2d Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 94 S. Ct. 232 (1973), rev'g 337 F. Supp. 1128 (S.D.N.Y. 1971)
(interpreting 1934 Act § 14(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1970), and quoting Electronic
Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937, 948 (2d Cir. 1969));
Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 313 F. Supp. 1251, 1258, 1260 (Eml. Pa. 1970) (de-
nial of preliminary injunction). See Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 498 F.2d 255,
286-87 (3d Cir.) (concurring and dissenting opinion), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 874 (1972),
modifying 322 F. Supp. 1331 (E.D. Pa. 1970); Electronic Specialty Co. v. International
Controls Corp., supra; SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 883 (2d Cir. 1968)
(en banc) (dissenting opinion), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969), on remand, 312 F. Supp.
77 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), modified, 446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971);
Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 337 F. Supp. at 1136; cf. SEC v. Capital
Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 192-94 (1963) (different standards at common
law); General Time Corp. v. Talley Indus., Inc., 403 F.2d 159, 162 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 1026 (1969) (proxy rules and election contest).
critical eye than either press releases or letters to stockholders mailed
during a proxy fight or tender offer. Aside from practical considerations,
this flexible approach is based soundly on a desire not to impair the flow
of voluntarily-released corporate information by imposing too strict a
standard.20
With this caveat in mind, we can explore a number of general rules
courts have used to judge whether or not a statement is misleading.
Later, we shall also discuss some standards for special applications.2 '
In general, a statement can be misleading for either of two reasons:
the items disclosed do not describe the facts accurately, or insufficient
data are revealed.22 The Tenth Circuit summarized these two points
nicely:
The misleading, misrepresented or untruthful character of the release may appear
from the nature of the statement considered alone, or, when the facts are fully dis-
dosed, from the half truths, omissions or absence of full candor concealed therein.23
Regarding the first reason, the Second Circuit in 1968 equated the
questions of whether a press release was "misleading" with "whether it
conveyed to the public a false impression of the drilling situation at the
time of its issuance."24 The court elaborated on the point when it re-
manded the case to the district court "for a determination of the character
of the release in the light of the facts existing at the time of the release,
by applying the standard of whether the reasonable investor, in the
exercise of due care, would have been misled by iL"' Therefore, a
20. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 882 (dissenting opinion); see tester
v. Preco Indus., Inc., 282 F. Supp. 459, 464 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). This consideration, though,
relates only to corporate publicity, since registration statements, proxy statements, reports
filed with the SEC, and the like are mandatory. Therefore, any loosening of the standards
will relate to voluntary-type publicity.
21. See Part IM infra.
22. The common law recognizes other types of misleading statements. According to
Restatement of Torts § 526 (1938), a misrepresentation is fraudulent if the maker:
"(a) knows or believes the matter to be otherwise than as represented, or
(b) knows that he has not the confidence in its existence or non-existence asserted by
his statement of knowledge or belief, or
(c) knows that he has not the basis for his knowledge or belief professed by his assertion."
The concepts embodied in all three clauses should be equally applicable to the Rule.
23. Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90, 97 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1004 (1971) and 405 U.S. 918 (1972) (emphasis added); accord, Gilbert v. Nixon,
429 F.2d 348 (10th Cir. 1970):
"The misrepresentation or omission must be misleading. This may appear from its nature
considered alone, or because it is not explained in a way to obviate its otherwise misleading
character." Id. at 356.
24. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 862.
25. Id. at 863. On the prior page, the court had observed that the "appropriate primary
1973] RULE 10b-5
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statement might be misleading under the first reason because it was not
understandable at all, it was unclear and hence was interpreted incor-
rectly, it contained a false statement, or it concealed data needed to
make itself accurate.
Whether a statement is misleading for the second reason-failure to
disclose sufficient data-depends on the context in which the statement
is made. When securities are bought, sold, or held on the basis of the
statement, sufficient facts must be disclosed so that an informed invest-
ment decision can be made.20 Similarly, a proxy statement27 sent to
voting stockholders must make "full and fair disclosure of those facts
that a stockholder might reasonably need in order to make an intelligent
decision with respect to the proposal."2" The test in a tender offer or
inquiry [should be] into the meaning of the statement to the reasonable investor and Its
relationship to truth." Id. at 862. The Second Circuit also noted that the public should be
able to evaluate a statement without having to read between the lines. Id. at 864. See also
Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d at 362-63 ("reasonable Investor");
Hohmann v. Packard Instrument Co., 471 F.2d 815 (7th Cir. 1973) ("certainly gave ado-
quate information to advise any reasonably prudent investor." Id. at 821); SEC v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 863 (a "reasonable investor" might have read between the
lines); Reynolds v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 309 F. Supp. 548, 562 (D. Utah 1970), modi-
fied sub nom. Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 1004 (1971) and 405 U.S. 918 (1972) (press release must be accurate, fair and
complete).
Note that the court in Kaplan v. Vornado, Inc., 341 F. Supp. 212 (N.D. Ill. 1971)
seemed to confuse two issues. The court properly observed that "[a] reasonable man, or,
as it has been called, a reasonable investor standard is to be used in determining whether
the contested representation is misleading or deceptive." Id. at 215. The judge then elab-
orated on the decision in City Natl Bank v. Vanderboom, 422 F.2d 221, 230-31 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 399 U.S. 905 (1970), which is really a test for determining under what condi-
tions the "in connection with" requirement of the Rule is satisfied by misrepresentations
and omissions. The Eighth Circuit's intent in the Vanderboom case is evidenced clearly by
its discussion in 422 F.2d at 229-30.
26. SEC v. North Am. Research & Dev. Corp., 424 F.2d 63, 77 (2d Cir. 1970). This Is
analogous to the treatment of half-truths; see notes 13-14 supra and accompanying text.
In Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), the
following test was espoused with regard to registration statements: "iT]he objectives of
full disclosure can be fully achieved only by complete revelation of facts which would be
material to the sophisticated investor or the securities professional not just the average
common shareholder. But, at the same time, the prospectus must not slight the less experi-
enced. They are entitled to have within the four comers of the document an intelligible
description of the transaction." Id. at 566.
27. A proxy statement could also be the basis for a trading decision, in which case the
test in the text accompanying note 26 supra would apply.
28. Richland v. Crandall, 262 F. Supp. 538, 553 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); accord, Allen v.
Penn Cent. Co., 350 F. Supp. 697 (E.D. Pa. 1972) ("read as a whole by a reasonable share-
holder," id. at 702; "must explain the proposal accurately and fully," id. at 705); Nanfito
v. Tekseed Hybrid Co., 341 F. Supp. 240 (D. Neb. 1972) ("full disclosure of all Informa-
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exchange offer is whether the security holder receives sufficient facts to
make a reasoned decision whether or not to tender or exchange his
certificates&9 Finally, stockholders in a proxy contest must be well enough
informed to be able to decide to whom to grant their proxy."0
These general tests apply when the recipient of the statement is,
depending upon the circumstances, a reasonable investor, reasonable
voting stockholder, or reasonable security holder in a tender or exchange
offer."' This is, therefore, a reasonable man standard,3 2 and includes
speculators and chartists. But the Second Circuit has indicated that a
statement is misleading only if it appears so to a reasonable investor who
exercises due care." This aspect should be distinguished from the
reasonable or justifiable reliance which some courts have required.!
tion which the ordinary investor of common business experience would require in making
an informed investment decision.' Id. at 243), aff'd, 473 F.2d 537 (8th Cir. 1973) ("all
information which would have enabled [plaintiff-stockholder] to determine how her interest
in the corporation might be altered" in the merger. Id. at 541); Browning Debenture
Holders' Comm. v. DASA Corp., 357 F. Supp. 1010 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (construing 1934 Act
§ 14(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970) and quoting Abramson v. Nytronics, Inc., 312 F. Supp.
519 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), where it was said that it was "enough if proxy material sets forth
all the facts necessary to enable a reasonably intelligent stockholder to make his own
informed decision." Id- at 524); cf. Robinson v. Penn Cent. Co., 336 F. Supp. 655 (E.D.
Pa. 1971) (construing 1934 Act § 14(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970)) ("our concern is not
the sophisticated analyst, but the reasonable stockholder . .. ." Id. at 657). Compare Rafal
v. Geneen, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. E 93,505, at 92,442 (E.D.
Pa. 1972) (proxy rules; may make a difference only to a few stockholders but nevertheless
misleading).
29. See Felt v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 564-65 (E.D.
N.Y. 1971); 3A H. Bloomenthal, Securities and Federal Corporate Law § 13.23 (1972).
30. See General Time Corp. v. Talley Indus, Inc., 403 F.2d 159, 162 (2d Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1026 (1969).
31. The Second Circuit did not elaborate on the meaning of "reasonable investor," ex-
cept to indicate that speculators and chartists are included in the definition. SEC v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co, 401 F.2d at 849. On remand, the district court did not elaborate either.
312 F. Supp. 77, 83 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), modified, 446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1005 (1971). The same result obtains under the tests for misleading proxy statements
when votes are taken. See note 28 supra and accompanying text for a treatment of the
concepts "reasonably needed" and reasonable stockholder.
32. Kaplan v. Vornado, Inc., 341 F. Supp. 212, 215 (ND. Ill. 1971). No case discusses
the standard of conduct to which the reasonable investor must conform. Cf. Securities Act
of 1933 § 11(c), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(c) (1970) [hereinafter cited by section as 1933 Act]
("prudent man in the management of his own property") and Trust Indenture Act of
1939 § 315(c), 15 U.S.C. § 77ooo(c) (1970) ("as a prudent man would exercise or use
under the circumstances in the conduct of his own affairs").
33. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 849; id. at 888 (dissenting opinion).
34. See text accompanying note 25 supra.
35. The issue as regards the misleading nature of a statement is whether a reasonable
investor would take away an impression which is contrary to the facts. Reasonable reliance
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As a corollary of this reasonable man standard, investors and stock-
holders can be presumed to have a general understanding of the
business world when determining whether a statement is misleading.80
Courts must read this qualification neither too broadly, which would
defeat otherwise valid claims, nor too narrowly, which would lead
companies to issue statements containing much obvious, commonly-known
information. This qualification is also clearly applicable to unspoken
assumptions. For example, an announcement of a large new contract
is not misleading merely because it omits a boilerplate sentence to the
effect that "there can be no assurance that the contract will be profitable."
Nor would a summary of the terms of a nonconvertible security be mis-
leading if it failed to mention lack of convertibility, since a reasonable
investor would properly assume that the security carried no conversion
privilege.17 Similarly, disclosure of a prospective purchaser's rights is
permissible without stating the rights he does not have.8  On the other
hand, a statement is misleading if a reasonable investor would assume
from the release that the underlying and undisclosed facts were typical,
while in reality they were not. 9 More difficult is the question of whether
a misrepresentation, rather than an omission, can be so outlandish to a
reasonable investor as to preclude the statement from being misleading.
While there is no controlling authority, a strict application of the test
pertains to the question of whether a reasonable man would believe the statement. For
example, an assertion that the company's president had learned to fly by flapping his hands
is misleading because it conveys a false impression, but it would not be believed because
it is so outrageous.
36. E.g., Symington Wayne Corp. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 383 F.2d 840 (2d CIr. 1967)
(question of tax law "of doubtful materiality in view of the wide awareness of the tax
consequences of selling stock and the availability of tax advice." Id. at 843); Gulf & W.
Indus., Inc. v. Great AtI. & Pac. Tea Co., 356 F. Supp. 1066, 1071 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 476
F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1973); Armstrong v. Sailboat Marine, Inc., (1970-1971 Transfer Binder]
CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ff 93,105, at 91,050 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) (not misrepresentation for
outsider to tell insider that corporation will go bankrupt); Swanson v. American Con-
sumer Indus., Inc., 288 F. Supp. 60, 65 (S.D. Ill. 1968), rev'd on other grounds, 415 F.2d
1326 (7th Cir. 1969) (spoon-feeding not required); Richland v. Crandall, 262 F. Supp. 538
(S.D.N.Y. 1967) ("not required to address . . .stockholders as if they were children in
kindergarten." Id. at 554); see Bowman v. Hartig, 334 F. Supp. 1323, 1328 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
See also Jacobsen Mfg. Co. v. Sterling Precision Corp., 282 F. Supp. 598, 602 (E.D. Wis.
1968) (placing one stock price in tender offer material is not misleading by virtue of failure
to give range of prices, since these prices are readily available).
37. Were v. Mack, [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ff 92,956, at
90,520 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
38. Ashton v. Thornley Realty Co., 346 F. Supp. 1294 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd, 471 F.2d
647 (2d Cir. 1973).
39. In such a situation, disclosure must be made if the issuer is, or should be, aware of
the facts.
for determining when a statement is misleading would prevent re-
covery.40 However, it does not follow that a naive plaintiff should never
be able to sue successfully 41 if the fact misrepresented is materia.- And
a particular plaintiff may be prohibited from invoking the Rule if he
knows, or perhaps if he should know, of the statement's misleading
nature. In short, a statement is not misleading if a reasonable investor
knows, or perhaps in the exercise of due diligence should know, the
truth concerning an omitted or misstated fact. Courts should make an
exception to this rule and consider a statement misleading when the
speaker knows the recipient will misconstrue it, although a reasonable
investor would not.4
A number of other principles supplement these tests for ascertaining
when enough data are disclosed. First, the statement must always be
materially misleading." This requirement does not arise from the Rule's
wording. Rather, courts have added it to preclude recovery for a minor
error. For example, a corporation might issue a press release reporting
earnings of $5.27 per share for the year when it knew the true figure was
$5.26 per share. A person purchasing on that basis has relied on a mis-
statement (he received the wrong impression) of a material fact, 5 but
he should not be permitted to recover damages. Perhaps this is equivalent
to saying the statement caused him no injury. Second, a series of minor
imperfections can be cumulated to render a statement misleading. Judge
Wright treated this issue under the guise of materiality, but his discus-
sion better relates to the question of whether a statement is misleading:
[I]t is proper to find a proxy statement . . . violated [section 14(a) of the 1934
40. See notes 24-25 supra and accompanying text.
41. In fact, only the unsophisticated investor could perhaps show reliance.
42. In considering the issue of materiality, one must ask if the misstated or omitted fact
is material assuming the statement as made would mislead a reasonable investor. 3A H.
Bloomenthal, Securities and Federal Corporate Law § 9.21, at 9-73 (1972).
43. Cf. Restatement of Torts § 538(b) (1938) (reaching same result in determination
of materiality).
44. See AM v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 383 (1970); Chris-Craft Indus.,
Inc., v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d at 362-63; id. at 398-99 (concurring and dissenting
opinion); Hope v. Hayden-Stone, Inc., 469 F.2d 1060, 1061 n.1 (5th Cir. 1972); Kohn v.
American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d at 271 (concurring and dissenting opinion); Green
v. Jonhop, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 413, 418 (D. Ore. 1973); Republic Tech. Fund, Inc. v. Lionel
Corp, 345 F. Supp. 656, 662 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), rev'd in part, 483 F2d 540 (2d Cir. 1973);
Nicholson File Co. v. H.K. Porter Co., 341 F. Supp. 508, 521 (D.RI. 1972), af'd, 482 F.2d
421 (1st Cir. 1973); cf. Allen v. Penn Cent. Co., 350 F. Supp. at 702 (proxy rules).
45. Earnings are almost always material, since they almost always affect the value of
the corporation's stock, which is the definition of materiality used in, eg., List v. Fashion
Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 US. 811 (1965); Kohler v.
Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 642 (7th Cir. 1963).
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Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970)] if one misstatement or omission influences another
and to find the aggregate "material." After a further development of the facts, it
may become apparent that although some or all of the alleged misstatements and
omissions are only slightly inaccurate or misleading, the combination of these mis-
statements will amount to inadequate disclosure ....
This Court is of the view that [section 14(a) does not allow] a proxy [statement]
to omit a factor or two here, disperse others through the proxy statement, make a
slightly misleading statement there, and rest on the assumption that the drafter's
task has been adequately performed if he can avoid blatant fraud and still keep
the stockholder from discovering which shell the pea is under.
40
Third, a difference of opinion has developed as to whether "puffing" or
"sales talk" is permissible. The better view is that such statements
should be considered misleading, even though the reliance requirement
sometimes may render them immune from a successful damage action.
46. Gould v. American Hawaiian S.S. Co., 319 F. Supp. 795, 809-10 (D. Del. 1970)
(motion for partial summary judgment); accord, Gould v. American Hawaiian S.S. Co.,
331 F. Supp. 981, 997 n.18 (D. Del. 1971) (second motion for partial summary judgment),
modified, 351 F. Supp. 853 (D. Del. 1972); Dillon v. Berg, 326 F. Supp. 1214, 1234 (D.
Del.), aff'd per curiam on other grounds, 453 F.2d 876 (3d Cir. 1971); Note, Publicity
and the Security Market: A Case Study, 7 U. Chi. L. Rev. 676, 691 (1940). Compare
Gilbert v. Nixon, 429 F.2d 348, 358-59 (10th Cir. 1970) (misrepresentation on some geo-
logical leases does not carry over to other leases which are geologically unconnected).
The aggregating of facts within a single document to determine if the document Is mis-
leading is different from the question whether a series of accurate statements closely related
in time and dealing with the same subject can be cumulated to make the series misleading.
Cf. AMEX Company Manual § 403(5), at 110 (1968) (when series of public announce-
ments can be "unwarranted promotional activity"). One example would be announcements
pertaining to a merger issued when negotiations commenced, when an agreement in prin-
ciple was reached, when each of the boards approved the transaction, when stockholders
of each constituent corporation voted, and when the merger was consummated. The theo-
retical basis for considering this a lob-5 breach is not readily apparent. Perhaps an argu-
ment could be made that while each statement alone is accurate, the overall impression
from so many statements is misleading.
47. Authorities permitting some puffing include: Bowman v. Hartig, 334 F. Supp. 1323,
1328 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (permissible if reasonable person would not believe the "puff");
Phillips v. Reynolds & Co., 294 F. Supp. 1249, 1256 (E.D. Pa.), motion to amend denied,
297 F. Supp. 736 (ED. Pa. 1969) ("puffing" not grounds for civil liability unless grossly
exaggerated); Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 490 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), rev'd, 438 F.2d
825 (2d Cir. 1971); SEC v. Chamberlain Associates, [1961-1964 Transfer Binder] CCH
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ff 91,228, at 94,070 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Comment, Texas Gulf Sulphur: A
Logical and Necessary Extension of Judicial History?, 17 U. Kan. L. Rev. 263, 276 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as Texas Gulf Sulphur Comment] (minor puffing permissible where no
intent to harm); Note, Civil Liability Under Section 10B and Rule 10B-5: A Suggestion
for Replacing the Doctrine of Privity, 74 Yale L.J. 658, 688-89 (1965); see Green v. Jon-
hop, Inc., 358 F. Supp. at 418.
Cases refusing to recognize puffing are cited in 6 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 3541-43
(Supp. 1969).
Fourth, the accuracy of a statement is measured at the time it is made. 8
Accordingly, a defendant cannot defend successfully on the ground that
a subsequent fortuitous event rendered a misleading statement true if
plaintiff was committed to act prior to such event. But a plaintiff should
not be permitted monetary recovery if he acted after, and knew of, the
subsequent event, even though the defendant breached the Rule. Con-
versely, subsequent unforseeable events cannot render misleading a state-
ment which was true when made.49
A number of circumstances have been cited as extrinsic evidence that
a statement is misleading."0 Failure of one side in a proxy contest or
contested tender or exchange offer to object to a statement by the other
side has been held to be some evidence that the statement is not mislead-
ing.5' On the other hand, absence of insider trading should not demon-
strate that a statement is true." Finally, market price movements have
been inspected to ascertain whether a release was bullish or bearish."3 An
increase in the market price of a corporation's stock after a statement is
disseminated, absent an intervening event or market trend, is evidence
that reasonable investors viewed the statement as favorable. Similarly, a
decline in the price tends to show the announcement was viewed pessi-
mistically. However, this standard must be applied judiciously when
rumors are circulating or if the market has already discounted the oc-
currence of the event. In the latter situation, the market movement after
a release probably would reflect a comparison between a reasonable in-
vestor's view of the release on the one hand, and the rumor or the antici-
pated scope of the event in the eyes of the investment community on the
48. Abrahams v. Aptman, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. U 93,818,
at 93,550 (S.D.N.Y., Mar. 9, 1973); Fenstermacher v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 351 F. Supp.
1015, 1022 (ElD. Pa. 1972).
49. For instance, an accurate announcement of the possibility of an ore strike is not
rendered misleading by a subsequent earthquake. Texas Gulf Sulphur Comment, supra note
47, at 276-77. The result might be otherwise if the events were foreseeable to a reasonable
issuer. Nevertheless, there might be a duty to correct the earlier release. On the other hand,
it would be misleading to state a fact which was true at the time made if the speaker con-
cealed that the situation would change. Compare Abrahams v. Aptman, [1972-1973 Trans-
fer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ff 93,818, at 93,550 (SJD.N.Y., Mar. 9, 1973).
50. As a matter of proof, where a contract memorializes the transaction in question,
that contract can be used as evidence of the understanding at the time of the signing.
Bowers v. Columbia Gen. Corp., 336 F. Supp. 609, 626 (D. Del. 1971). The contract does
not foreclose attack by the plaintiff, however. Id.
51. Cf. General Time Corp. v. Talley Indus., Inc., 403 F.2d 159, 162 (2d Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1026 (1969) (construing 1934 Act § 14(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970))
(it is evidence of lack of materiality if the other side does not object during proxy contest).
52. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 860 (absence of insider trading also
does not prove absence of motive).
53. Id. at 863; id. at 866 (concurring opinion); id. at 880 (dissenting opinion).
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other. It follows that a market decline after a release could mean either
that the release was adjudged unfavorable, or that the release was be-
lieved favorable but not as bullish as the result the market had assumed
would occur. 4
Whether an item is misleading is a fact issue. 5 Ambiguities should be
construed in favor of investors, tendering or exchanging security holders,
and voting stockholders, since the securities laws are intended to protect
them.56
Merely because a statement is misleading does not mean the Rule has
been violated. 7 And even if an infraction has occurred, the plaintiff does
not ipso facto have a cause of action for damages. 8
Judicial views have been expressed regarding the type of information
which must be disclosed in a document. Courts have opined that only
"facts,"59 and not conclusions or predictions,60 must be revealed. Indeed,
54. This type of comparison was made in the dissenting opinion in Texas Gulf Sulphur
but not in the opinion of the court. Compare id. at 863 (majority opinion) with id. at
880 (dissenting opinion). Significant market reaction to a statement correcting a prior re-
lease should be evidence that the prior release was misleading.
See also Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d at 292-93 (concurring and dis-
senting opinion) (permissible to disclose "actual" state of affairs, although not technically
true; however, case deals with atypical fact pattern).
55. See Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d at 293 (concurring and dissent-
ing opinion); note 25 supra and accompanying text.
56. See SEC v. North Am. Research & Dev. Corp., 424 F.2d 63, 77 (2d Cir. 1970);
Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 298 F. Supp. 66, 95 (E.D.N.Y. 1969), aft'd, 478 F.2d 1281
(2d Cir. 1973); cf. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 385 (1970) (construing
1934 Act § 14(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970)) (once materiality is shown, should resolve
all doubts regarding causation in favor of stockholders, since statute designed to protect
them); Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d at 375 (tender offer
provisions); id. at 399 (concurring and dissenting opinion). See also Restatement of Torts
§ 527 (1938) (construe ambiguous representation against maker if he intended that false
meaning should be conveyed).
57. For instance, the information contained in the statement may be false-causing the
statement to be misleading-but no violation would ensue if the facts were gathered by
the issuer with due diligence.
58. One instance would be where a press release was misleadingly pessimistic and plain-
tiff bought securities as a result. Cf. Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d at
293 (concurring and dissenting opinion) (full disclosure would have given even more reason
for the shareholders to vote as they did); List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 227 F. Supp. 906,
912 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), aff'd, 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965) (con-
cealment of pessimistic fact when plaintiff sells). This is a question of reliance or causation.
59. See authorities cited in note 72 infra.
This is a different concept from the construction of the word "fact" in the context of
"material fact." Thus, for instance, the SEC's position for many years has been that pro-
jections and forecasts cannot be placed in a prospectus, even if such information were
material facts. See Daum & Phillips, The Implications of Cady, Roberts, 17 Bus. Law. 939,
954 (1962); Part IUI-G infra (regarding projections and forecasts). But projections are
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disclosure of vague generalities rather than facts can be objectionable.'
Naturally, a statement is not inherently misleading if facts as well
as conclusions or future events are presented fairly, but liability may still
flow from an erroneous conclusion or prediction. 2 Thus a corporation
need not reveal conclusory material such as: explanations made to
establish anticipatory defenses to stockholders' claims; I the possible
social effects of business practices;" arguments against an adequately
described course of action or conflicting interpretations of the facts;O
alternative courses of action; 66 or arguments against a proposal sub-
mitted to stockholders. 7 Nor is there any need to prophesy future
effects of a transaction where they are "remote, uncertain or possible
consequences [and] beyond [the defendant's] control."'0 s Yet disclosure
should be required of consequences which are relatively sure to flow
from the transaction but may not be obvious to the reasonable investor.
facts in the sense that a cause of action arises if they are stated and are misleading. See
Part II-G infra.
60. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 864 ("conclusory assertions of success"
unnecessary) ; Green v. Jonhop, Inc., 358 F. Supp. at 418 (do not have to disclose account-
ing change if do not know if it will affect earnings); Prettner v. Aston, 339 F. Supp. 273,
290 (D. DeL 1972) (allow stockholders to evaluate facts; no need to prophesy). See also
Allen v. Penn Cent. Co., 350 F. Supp. at 703-04 (proxy rules; speculations should not be
placed in proxy statement since like a prediction which is prohibited by note to 1934 Act
Rule 14a-9, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1973); wild guesses also should not be included). Ex-
plicit disclosures are preferred since they do not encourage a "rumor mill." SEC v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 864 (quoting the lower court opinion, 258 F. Supp. 262, 296
(S.D.N.Y. 1966)). See also Nanfito v. Tekseed Hybrid Co., 341 F. Supp. 240 (D. Neb.
1972), aff'd, 473 F.2d 537 (8th Cir. 1973) (management does not have to interpret informa-
tion or "provide an expert opinion as to all the possible ramifications." Id. at 243).
61. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 863-64 (urgency no excuse for vague-
ness); see Texas Gulf Sulphur Comment, supra note 47, at 278 (do not give inferences and
conclusions until "they have been reasonably substantiated").
62. See, e.g., Part ]I-G infra.
63. Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 298 F. Supp. at 95.
64. Prettner v. Aston, 339 F. Supp. at 291-92.
65. Abramson v. Nytronics, Inc., 312 F. Supp. 519, 524 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); cf. Allen v.
Penn Cent. Co., 350 F. Supp. at 705 (proxy rules).
66. Cf. Allen v. Penn Cent. Co., 350 F. Supp. at 703 (construing proxy rules); Puma
v. Marriott, 348 F. Supp. 18, 22-23 (D. DeL 1972) (1934 Act § 14(a), 15 US.C. § 78n(a)
(1970)).
67. Allen v. Penn Cent. Co., 350 F. Supp. at 704-05.
68. Crane Co. v. American Standard Inc., [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. ff 92,228, at 97,061 (S!D.N.Y. 1968), modified on other grounds, 419 F.2d 787 (2d
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970); accord, Colonial Realty Corp. v. Brunswick
Corp., 337 F. Supp. 546, 552-53 (S-D.N.Y. 1971) (prediction of saturation of market not
made in prospectus; no cause of action since prediction was at best an educated guess);
Most v. Alleghany Corp., [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. U 92,583,
at 98,666 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). See Part 1TI-G infra concerning projections of future events.
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None of this permits announcement of bare facts if key issues are not
clearly defined,69 nor does it justify beclouding a document.70 The draw-
back of disclosing facts but not conclusions or future effects is that the
unsophisticated stockholder may be unable to evaluate the facts as well
as sophisticated investors or insiders. Everyone has a relatively equal
chance when, for example, news of a dividend cut is published, but the
situation is quite different when a company announces an ore strike by
summarizing an assay report. The most that can be said for mere dis-
closure of facts is that, while it places the average investor who needs
the greatest protection at a disadvantage, it does satisfy the Rule's policy
that investors be given equal access to information. 71
A related problem is, what facts must be disclosed? First, disclosure
is required only of important facts.72 Placing all facts, however trivial,
in a document would confuse the reader rather than aid him. 73 Further-
more, the Rule is breached only by a misleading statement of a "material"
fact. It follows that only the essence of a point need be disclosed, not the
minute details. For example, it is sufficient if a buyer of a security is
aware that the issuer has gone bankrupt because of unwise and now
worthless investments; he need not know what the investments were or
that the management was warned about the speculativeness of its hold-
ings. Second, the important facts which must be disclosed are those
which are known, or in exercise of due diligence should be known, by
the maker of the statement." Thus, a release normally must contain
69. Robinson v. Penn Cent. Co., 336 F. Supp. 655, 658 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
70. Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 298 F. Supp. at 95; see Kohn v. American Metal
Climax, Inc., 322 F. Supp. at 1361 (even if statements literally true, this is insufficient
where the general effect is to mislead); cf. Allen v. Penn Cent. Co., 350 F. Supp. at 702
(insufficient if no major misstatement but still conveys misleading impression); Felt v.
Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 549, 564-65 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) (re
1933 Act § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970)). See also Abramson v. Nytronics, Inc., 312 F.
Supp. at 524 ("It is of course possible to present facts in a manner calculated to confuse
and deceive . . . " Id.).
71. Texas Gulf Sulphur Comment, supra note 47, at 278; 35 Brooklyn L. Rev. 326, 332
(1969). But equal access is of course only one of many policies underlying the Rule.
The approach in the text is also consistent with the view that the results of the In-
sider's perceptive analysis need not be disclosed. Id. at 332-33 & n.41.
72. Gulf & W. Indus., Inc. v. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 476 F.2d 687, 697 (2d
Cir. 1973); see Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d at 800; Dolgow v.
Anderson, 53 F.R.D. 664, 688 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd per curiam, 464 F.2d 437 (2d Cir.
1972) ; Richland v. Crandall, 262 F. Supp. 538, 553 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
73. Cf. Allen v. Penn Cent. Co., 350 F. Supp. at 703, 705 (proxy rules).
74. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 863; cf. SEC v. Great Am. Indus.,
Inc., 259 F. Supp. 99, 109 & n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), rev'd on other grounds, 407 F.2d 453 (2d
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 920 (1969) (not misleading unless issuer knows the fact
or statement was recklessly made). The knowledge of an employee of a corporation is
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up-to-date information."5 But this may be impossible when a fast-moving
situation develops at a distant point. Under such circumstances, a
document may be issued containing the most recently available facts
if the inherent staleness of the data is made clear."0 This is part of the
problem of timing press releases. A company runs risks if it discloses too
soon or too late. Should hindsight indicate that a premature statement
was misleading, the issuer is likely to be sued even if it distributes a
clarifying release.-, On the other hand, insiders might trade or tip, and
thus violate the Rule, while the release of important data is being de-
layed. 8 And third, ordinarily the impact on the company is all that must
be disclosed; but in a transaction with an insider, the benefits accruing
to the insider also should be revealed. 9
Courts have split on whether a subjective or an objective standard
should be used to determine which facts to include in a statement. Some
opinions condone the use of reasonable business judgment or permit
reliance on expert opinions.8 0 The better-reasoned conclusion, however,
is to reject these defenses because investors and stockholders are
entitled to full disclosure rather than to what the issuer believes is
proper.8 ' It follows that some courts would not compel disclosures which
naturally less broad in general than that of his employer. See Bahlman, Rule 10b-5: The
Case for its Full Acceptance as Federal Corporation Law, 37 U. Cin. L. Rev. 727, 763
(1968).
75. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 863-64.
Giving a financial statement to a person when the facts have changed materially since
the date of the statement would usually be a half-truth; however this is not always true.
See Lane v. Midwest Bancshares Corp., 337 F. Supp. 1200, 1210 (E.D. Ark. 1972).
76. SEC. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 863-64; see Mitchell v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90, 98 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 US. 1004 (1971) and 405 U.S.
918 (1972).
77. See note 94 infra; cf. note 252 infra and accompanying text.
78. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 850 n.12.
79. Cf. Puma v. Marriott, 348 F. Supp. 18, 22-23 (D. Del 1972) (proxy rules).
80. Dolgow v. Anderson, 53 F.R.D. at 679-80, 6S8 (no liability for using accounting
treatment in accord with expert opinion; can also use business judgment); Stull v. Kay-
marq Consol. Corp., [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. U 92,308, at
98,364 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); SEC v. Great Am. Indus., Inc., 259 F. Supp. at 107.
81. Waddell & Reed, Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9790 (Sept. 25,
1972), [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. U 79,049, at 82,274 n.4 (cannot
shift duty to counsel); see National Underwriters, Inc., SEC No-action letter (Dec. 27,
1971), [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ff 78,720, at 81,518; cf.
Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Independent Stockholders Comm., 354 F. Supp. 895, 915
(D. Del. 1973) (concerning 1934 Act § 14(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970)) (can rely
on experts but still must read proxy statement and correct facts which knew or should
know are wrong); Gould v. American Hawaiian S.S. Co., 351 F. Supp. 853, 863,
867-68 & n.20 (D. Del 1972) (construing 1934 Act § 14(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970))
(no defense that relied on attorneys to prepare proxy statement; leave open question of
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would injure a corporation's business, 2 whereas others correctly require
the baring of all significant facts.83 Publicizing data which could injure
the issuer's competitive position is one manifestation of this last point.
Another example is a premature announcement in a proxy statement or
registration statement of a contemplated closing of a major plant, which
could lead to a wildcat strike. Still another example is a company's desire
not to disclose in its balance sheet its holdings of stock of another issuer,
because the company intends to acquire more shares without driving up
the price.84 Permitting less than candid announcements because they
were in accord with business judgment would open the floodgates, for a
business reason for concealing a fact can almost always be manufactured.
Thoughts can be expressed in any of an infinite number of ways so
long as the rules discussed above are met."' In other words, courts will not
act as a copy editor for statements which meet disclosure standards."0
The form of presentation is irrelevant if no other issue is resolved
against the maker.8
7
A related topic is that of a corporation's liability when erroneous state-
ments about it are made by newspapers, magazines, financial reporting
services (like the stock-market's broad tape), or other types of publica-
tions. Two fact patterns are possible. First, one court decided an issuer
liability of person who informs attorney of misrepresentation and receives assurances from
him that disclosure is adequate); Berman v. Thompson, 312 F. Supp. 1031, 1035 (N.D. Ill.
1970) (construing 1934 Act § 14(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970)). See also Chris-Craft
Indus,, Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d at 373 n.27 (investment banker cannot rely
solely on what company officers tell it); Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp.
643, 697 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (1933 Act § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970)). Care must be taken to
distinguish this from, e.g., the question of how big an accounting reserve should be taken,
which is a question of business judgment. See notes 138-39 infra and accompanying text.
82. Cf. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 850 n.12.
83. See cases cited in notes 80-81 supra. But the data which must be disclosed need not
include trade secrets or formulae; it is sufficient to announce the discovery. Schoenbaum
v. Firstbrook, 268 F. Supp. 385, 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), aff'd, 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.), rev'd
on other grounds on rehearing en bane, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S.
906 (1969); Comment, The Regulation of Corporate Tender Offers Under Federal Securi-
ties Law: A New Challenge for Rule l0b-5, 33 U. Chi. L. Rev. 359, 369 n.43 (1966).
84. Cf. Berman v. Thomson, 312 F. Supp. 1031, 1035 (N.D. Ill. 1970) (interpreting §
14(a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970)).
88. Richland v. Crandall, 262 F. Supp. at 553-54; cf. Allen v. Penn Cent. Co., 350 F.
Supp. at 703 (construing proxy rules); Browning Debenture Holders' Comm. v. DASA
Corp., (1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ff 93,473, at 92,316 (S.D.N.Y.
1972) (construing 1934 Act § 14(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970)).
86. Cf. Browning Debenture Holders' Comm. v. DASA Corp., [1971-1972 Transfer
Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. I 93,473, at 92,316. See also Allen v. Penn Cent. Co., 350
F. Supp. at 706 (weakness in disclosure due to "inherent limitations of the art form." Id.).
87. But see Part III-A infra (placement of information in long documents).
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was liable when the news media erroneously summarized the company's
release. 8 In that case, the press release could not easily be summarized.
A different result should obtain where the press release is clear but the
news media are negligent or make a clerical mistake. 9 Second, cases have
failed to hold a corporation legally responsible for inaccurate items ap-
pearing in the press when the items are not supplied by or attributed to
it.9" Any other result would place a burden on companies to read numer-
ous publications, and would force them to correct any misleading im-
pressions at a time when they may desire not to make disclosure for
business reasons and may be under no other legal duty to make an an-
nouncement. To take one extreme example, were the duty to correct ex-
tended to projections made in brokers' market letters, companies would
probably be forced to issue their own projections continuously. On the
other hand, this reasoning has been justly criticized.' The best approach
would be to require correction by the corporation if it learns of the state-
ment and has no valid corporate reason for withholding the facts.
The reverse of these two situations occurs when a speaker relies on an
outside source for some of his facts. Even if he cites his source, -9 2 his
statement would be misleading if he goes beyond the information given
him by the source or if he knows (or in the exercise of due diligence
should suspect) that the source's data were untrue.03
88. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 312 F. Supp. 77, 86 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), modified,
446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971); see Dayan, Correcting Errors
in the Press, 5 Rev. of Secs. Reg. 941, 944 (1972). The press release here was "for im-
mediate release," but this should not make a difference in result; see notes 75-78 supra
and accompanying text. The court in Texas Gulf Sulphur made an impractical suggestion
that a company should send press releases to stockholders if it wanted to insure that the
release would not be distorted by the media. 312 F. Supp. at 86. A better rationale of the
decision, which itself seems correct, is that the risk is on the issuer whenever the release
can easily be misconstrued. Cf. Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp.,
409 F.2d 937, 951 (2d Cir. 1969) (1934 Act § 14(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1970)) (news-
paper story based on interview initiated by reporter).
89. A clerical mistake might consist of reporting earnings at $190,000 rather than
$910,000 because a typist at the news media transposed the numbers.
90. Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d at 949; Milberg
v. Western Pac. R.R., 51 F.R.D. 280, 282 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), appeal dismissed sub nor.
Kor v. Franchard Corp., 443 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1971).
91. Dayan, supra note 88, at 943. In addition, stock exchange rules may require a com-
pany to correct rumors and the like not attributable to it. Eg., NYSE Company Manual §
A2, at A-18 (1968); AMEX Company Manual § 403(3) (1968).
92. Comment, Negligent Misrepresentations Under Rule lob-5, 32 U. Cli. L. Rev. 824,
843 (1965). A fortiori, failure to reveal a source would lead to liability, at least where a
reasonable investor would not realize the speaker had received the information from an
outsider.
93. See Shearson, Hammill & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7743 (Nov.
12, 1965), [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ff 77,306, at 82,524.
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The final issue is the maximum length of time-as measured between
the publication of a misleading statement and plaintiff's trade, vote, or
tender based thereon-which will support a 10b-5 claim. Put another
way, how long does a false statement survive after its issuance? It is
clear that a statement which is still "alive" could not be the basis for a
damage action after a correction is disseminated publicly and assimilated
by the market. 4 The length of time a misleading statement survives in
the absence of a correcting release is not so clear. One possible view is
that the erroneous statement continues indefinitely. Another is to limit
the period, based on such factors as: the seriousness of the misrepre-
sentation or omission, the type of data to which the statement relates,
the importance of the statement, the degree of defendants' negligence or
scienter, the breadth of the statement's distribution, and the frequency
with which it continues to be quoted in the investment community. What-
ever the appropriate period, it would start anew with each republica-
tion.95
III. SPECIAL APPLICATIONS
In addition to the general rules regarding the misleading nature of a
statement (discussed in the preceding section), several guidelines for
special applications have been developed in the following specific areas:
long documents (such as proxy statements and registration statements);
financial statements; intention and promises; motive; concealment, dis-
closure, and fairness; implied statements; and opinions and forecasts.
We will discuss each of these areas in turn.
A. Proxy Statements, Registration Statements,
and Other Long Documents
In dealing with relatively long or complex documents, most com-
monly registration statements and merger proxy statements, 0 courts in
the past have applied two doctrines-the "buried fact" doctrine97 and
94. The time for the correction to be assimilated should be the same as would be re-
quired for an ordinary press release containing the same information to be absorbed, as.
suming the corrections were disseminated adequately. See Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co., 446 F.2d at 103, 105.
95. See SEC v. Electrogen Indus. Inc., [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. ff 92,156, at 96,717-18 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
96. A wide variety of other statements may fall into this category. Kaplan v. Vornado,
Inc., 341 F. Supp. 212, 216 (N.D. Ill. 1971) (face of debenture) is one other example of the
applicability of the two doctrines mentioned in the text. Theoretically, they should apply
to long and complex oral assertions too.
See also General Time Corp. v. Talley Indus., Inc., 403 F.2d at 162 (doubtful whether
proxy statement is read closely anyway).
97. Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d at 297-300 (concurring and dis-
senting opinion) (discussing buried facts doctrine).
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the "similar emphasis" doctrine. These doctrines are similar in that the
underlying issue in both is whether or not a reasonable investor would
have or should have discovered the real facts-for one doctrine, the
question focuses on the "buried" facts and, for the other, on the data
that were not given equal prominence.
In Gould v. American Hawaiian Steamship Co., 8 disclosure in a
merger proxy statement of conflicts of interest of certain directors regard-
ing the proposed merger was attacked by the court under both doc-
trines. First, a reading of various parts of the proxy statement was neces-
sary to garner all the facts concerning the conflicts. Although all con-
flicts were revealed, they were not collected in one section. The court
held that this was a violation of the "buried facts" doctrine:
The various facts listed previously which the defendants contend adequately re-
veal any conflict are interspersed throughout the proxy materials and could be
gleaned only through a close and prolonged perusal. Under the buried facts doctrine,
such disclosures are insufficient. 9
Other cases have condemned different manifestations of the "buried
facts" doctrine: disclosing important data only in appendices to a
lengthy document,0 0 even though a cross reference to the appendices ap-
pears in the body of the material;' 0 ' and placing facts Ivhere an investor
is not apt to see them as, for example, at the end of a section or under an
inappropriate heading.102 Accordingly, the "buried facts" doctrine pro-
hibits both fragmentation of information and placement of important
data where they are not likely to be found. All of this does not mean
that each fact must be placed in bold face type on the cover page. But
the doctrine does mandate that "[t]he more material the facts, the more
they should be brought to the attention of the public."' 3
98. 331 F. Supp. 981 (D. Del. 1971), modified, 351 F. Supp. 853 (D. Del. 1972). This
was a case arising under the proxy rules, but the same doctrines are equally applicable to
10b-5 cases.
99. Id. at 996; accord, Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F2d at 265; Mills v.
Electric Auto-Lite Co., 403 F.2d 429, 432-35 (7th Cir. 1968), vacated on other grounds,
396 U.S. 375 (1970); Norte & Co. v. Huffines, 304 F. Supp. 1096, 1106 (S.D.N.Y. 1968),
modified, 416 F.2d 1189 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 US. 989 (1970); Richland v.
Crandall, 262 F. Supp. at 553-54 (dictum).
100. Cf. Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d at 267-68 (discussing both
buried facts and similar emphasis doctrines). Compare id. at 297-300 (concurring and dis-
seating opinion).
101. Thus, a reference in the text to an appendix where a fact is disclosed would be
insufficient if the fact were important and the cross reference were a bare one-=such as
"See Appendix B." By contrast, in Kohn, a textual cross reference which alerted the reader
to the essence of the topic was sufficient for purposes of the similar emphasis doctrine. Id.
at 267-68.
102. Norte & Co. v. Huffines, 304 F. Supp. at 1106.
103. Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 322 F. Supp. at 1362. One indication of im-
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Second, the court in Gould also attacked the proxy statement under
the "similar emphasis" doctrine.04 This doctrine requires that a fact
necessary to make a statement not misleading must be revealed with the
same amount of prominence as that given to the statement itself.100 The
most common application of this doctrine involves a board of directors'
recommendation in favor of a proposition; in such a case, equal em-
phasis has to be given to any conflicts of interest,100 to whether any mem-
ber of the Board dissented from the recommendation, and to suits for
mismanagement filed against the directors.107 However, the "similar em-
phasis" doctrine does not prevent reasonable latitude in the form of
presentation, 08 nor does it preclude using bold face type for only some
facts. 09
A statement can violate both the "buried facts" doctrine and the
"similar emphasis" doctrine. The latter governs fewer situations, but is
more demanding when applicable. 110
The SEC reviews all registration statements and most proxy state-
ments. Yet courts generally have not accorded this review any weight
when finding breaches of these two doctrines, although by their nature
these breaches theoretically should have been detected by the Commis-
sion's staff."'
In addition to these two doctrines, other rules govern disclosures in
proxy statements and registration statements. With regard to the former,
the proxy rules do not specifically require information to be updated
between the time the material is mailed to stockholders and the meeting.
Nevertheless, updated data should be supplied if the facts change ma-
portance in the abstract are those items the SEC requires to be included in a summary
prospectus or summary in front of a merger proxy statement.
104. 331 F. Supp. at 995. It also has been called the equal prominence rule. Kohn v.
American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d at 267.
105. Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d at 268; Kaplan v. Vornado, Inc.,
341 F. Supp. 212, 216 (N.D. Ill. 1971); Gould v. American Hawaiian S.S. Co., 331 F. Supp.
at 994-97.
106. Gould v. American Hawaiian S.S. Co., 331 F. Supp. at 994-97; Mills v. Electric
Auto-Lite Co., 403 F.2d at 432-35. CL Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d at
267.
107. See Robinson v. Penn Cent. Co., 336 F. Supp. 655, 658 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (con-
struing 1934 Act § 14(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970)).
108. Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d at 267; id. at 300 (concurring and
dissenting opinion).
109. Id. at 267; Kaplan v. Vornado, Inc., 341 F. Supp. at 216.
110. That is, although a fact may not be buried, it may nevertheless not be given
similar prominence compared to the statement it is intended to offset.
111. No case other than Abramson v. Nytronics, Inc., 312 F. Supp. 519, 526 (S.D.N.Y.
1970), mentions this point.
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terially." 2 In addition, the rules discussed below should apply mutatis
mutandis to a merger proxy statement, which is considered by practi-
tioners as the equivalent of a registration statement for both constituent
corporations 13
Registration statements pose other problems. The SEC has published
a number of forms which instruct issuers to place certain information in
a registration statement. A rebuttable presumption that a registration
statement is misleading should arise from failure to comply with those
instructions which are important under the circumstances; yet technical
compliance with the form does not insure full disclosure 1  The commis-
sion also has promulgated guidelines for disclosures in registration state-
ments;" 5 but non-observance of these guidelines does not ipso facto
render the registration statement misleading, at least when the only issue
is the location of data in the prospectus."16 It follows that some facts need
not appear on the cover page so long as they are disclosed adequately
elsewhere in the prospectus."'
The period during which a registration statement must be accurate is
another matter. Section eleven of the 1933 Act mandates that a registra-
tion statement be correct only on its effective date.118 The Rule imposes
the same requirement; if the registration statement is misleading on the
effective date, the Rule provides redress to persons purchasing securities
112. Gould v. American Hawaiian S.S. Co., 351 F. Supp. at 868. In General Time Corp.
v. Talley Indus., Inc., the second circuit assumed that 1934 Act Rule 14a-9, 17 C.F.R. §
240.14a-9 (1973), would require updating "although the words of [14a-9] are not exactly
apt to that end." 403 F.2d at 163. But it then decided no updating was necessary under
the facts because the closer to the meeting date, the greater must be the materiality to
warrant correction. Accord, Allen v. Penn Cent. Co., 350 F. Supp. at 705. Rule 14a-9 does,
however, clearly require updating of data if further oral or written solicitation is under-
taken. But see Prettner v. Aston, 339 F. Supp. at 284 (must judge in light of circum-
stances on date mailed).
113. See Item 14 of Schedule 14A of 1934 Act, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 (1973). Under
1933 Act Rule 145, 17 C.F.R. § 230.145 (1973), the sort of investor protection provided
by the registration process is also extended to most merger proxy statements.
Note that a corporation is not responsible for the content or preparation of the portion
of the proxy material relating to its merger partner. Beatty v. Bright, 345 F. Supp. 1188,
1191-92 (S.D. Iowa 1972) (not responsible even though party had control over sufficiency
of proxy statement); Alameda Oil Co. v. Ideal Basic Indus., Inc., 337 F. Supp. 194, 196-97
(D. Colo. 1972).
114. See 1933 Act Rule 408, 17 C.F.R. § 230.408 (1973); cf. Feit v. Leasco Data Proc-
essing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 564 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) (interpreting 1933 Act § 11,
15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970)).
115. SEC Securities Act Release No. 4936 (Dec. 9, 1968), [1967-1969 Transfer Binder]
CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. § 77,636.
116. DiJuio v. Digicon, Inc., 339 F. Supp. 1284, 1289-90 (D. Md. 1972).
117. Id. at 1288.
118. 1933 Act § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970).
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in the offering and also to those who trade in the after-market."n The
Rule also requires accuracy on each day during which securities are
being distributed under the registration statement 120 and during a ninety-
day period after the effective date if the 1933 Act1"' necessitates that
dealers deliver a prospectus then. 12 Updating corrections may be made
by either affixing a sticker to the prospectus or amending the registration
statement.1
3
Two miscellaneous topics remain. First, a registration statement cover-
ing an exchange offer must disclose information concerning the target
company since such facts are important to the investment decision of
the target-company security holders. 2 1 Second, terms of securities and
contracts are frequently summarized in registration statements. Prefac-
ing the summary with a statement somewhat as follows will afford some
protection to a charge of inadequate disclosure: 25 "The terms of the
Debentures are governed by an Indenture, a copy of which is filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission as an exhibit to the Registra-
tion Statement of which this Prospectus is a part, and the following sum-
mary of those terms does not purport to be complete and is qualified in
its entirety by express reference to the Indenture."
B. Financial Statements
Financial statements often are the crux of a securities document. They
must conform to the general tests for determining if a document is mis-
leading, 2  but they also pose special problems of their own.
119. Speros v. Nelson, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 93,791, at
93,426 (D. Ore. 1973); Guarantee Ins. Agency, Co. v. Mid-Continent Realty Corp., [1972-
1973 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ff 93,723, at 93,206-07 (N.D. Ill. 1972); see
Goldsmith v. Pyramid Communications, Inc., [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. ff 93,732, at 93,235 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Frankel v. Wyllie & Thornhill, Inc., [1972-1973
Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. II 93,672, at 92,993 (W.D. Va. 1972).
120. For shelf registration statements--where selling security holders dribble their securi-
ties into the market over an extended period-as well as for registration statements per-
taining to warrants or a typical convertible Eurodollar bond, this imposes on the issuer an
obligation to keep the prospectus up-to-date (or "evergreen") for an extended period.
121. 1933 Act § 4(3), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(3) (1970); 1933 Act Rule 174, 17 C.F.R. §
230.174 (1973). The period under certain circumstances can be 40 days. 1933 Act § 4(3),
15 U.S.C. § 77d(3) (1970).
122. SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 340 F. Supp. 913, 933 (S.D.N.Y. 1971),
modified on other grounds, 458 F.2d 1082, 1095-96 (2d Cir. 1972); SEC v. Bangor Punta
Corp., 331 F. Supp. 1154, 1160 n.10 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), modified sub nom. Chris-Craft
Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 94 S. Ct. 232
(1973).
123. See 1 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 293 (2d ed. 1961).
124. Cf. Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. at 569.
125. See Abramson v. Burroughs Corp., [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. See. L.
Rep. U 93,456 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
126. See Part II supra.
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Accountants have formulated generally accepted accounting principles
to which financial statements should conform. A number of cases have
found disclosure adequate under the Rule if this standard is met. -T Yet
financial statements are misleading even if prepared in accordance with
those principles if the statements do not disclose adequately the true
state of affairs. In that event, textual discussion supplementing the state-
ments is necessary. In other words, with respect to disclosure by the
company, any conflict between full disclosure and generally accepted ac-
counting principles is resolved in favor of the former.1-8
Applications of this rule are numerous. For instance, it is misleading
to conceal that an earnings increase was due to a change in accounting
practices;" s to show book values of assets in the balance sheet, without
revealing the higher market value at some point in the document, if
liquidation is intended or can reasonably be anticipated; 13 to omit ex-
planations of large variations from year to year in a multi-period income
statement; or to fail to disclose seasonal factors after an income state-
ment.131
127. Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 640 (7th Cir. 1963) (it is permissible to set up
books in a certain way for sound business reasons, at least absent an intent to mislead);
Colonial Realty Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., 337 F. Supp. 546, 551 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Dolgow
v. Anderson, 53 F.R.D. at 679-80.
128. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 Fad at 406 (concurring and
dissenting opinion); SEC v. Bangor Punta Corp., 331 F. Supp. at 1163. But d. Dolgow v.
Anderson, 53 F.R.D. at 688. However, some liabilities may be disclosed in footnotes.
Blakely v. Lisac, 357 F. Supp. 255, 261 (D. Ore. 1972).
An auditing accountant's obligations usually should be deemed satisfied if generally ac-
cepted accounting principles are applied correctly, but the accountant has a duty to in-
vestigate further and make full disclosure if his suspicions are aroused. Cf. United States v.
Simon, 425 Fad 796, 805-07 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1006 (1970) (may be
very persuasive but not conclusive evidence that accountant acted in good faith and finan-
cial statements were not misleading).
129. Butler Aviation Intl, Inc. v. Comprehensive Designers, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 910, 913-
14 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd, 425 F.2d 842 (2d Cir. 1970); cf. Green v. Jonhop, Inc., 358 F.
Supp. at 418 (do not have to disclose change of accounting method if do not know if it
will affect earnings). See also Address by former SEC Chairman William J. Casey before
the Financial Executives Institute at Las Vegas, Nevada, Oct. 18, 1972, in [1972-1973
Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 79,045 (discussing elections and changes in
financial statements).
130. Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 298 F. Supp. at 103. For a discussion concern-
ing misstatement and concealment of intent to liquidate a corporation see notes 164-75
infra and accompanying text.
131. In registration statements and merger proxy statements, disclosures of variations
among years and of seasonal differences customarily are placed in the text following the
income statement. However, the explanation can be placed anywhere in the document
without violating the Rule, so long as the buried fact and similar emphasis rules are
followed. See notes 97-113 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of these rules.
In a release, the commission has stated:
"Among events and circumstances which may require additional disclosure to provide
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It also follows that lack of conformity with generally accepted ac-
counting principles is per se evidence that the statements are mislead-
ing.182 Thus, statements are deficient when earnings are arbitrarily ma-
nipulated by improper deferral techniques, 18  debt of consolidated sub-
sidiaries is omitted from a consolidated balance sheet, 84 pooled results
of operations for one year are compared against pre-pooled results for
the prior year,185 or earnings per share are stated without noting the
dilution of residual securities.' And of course, financial statements con-
taining inaccurate figures also are misleading'8 7
information needed for the understanding of reports of operations for successive periods
are the seasonal sale of a single-crop agricultural commodity, a business combination
treated for accounting purposes as a pooling of interests, the disposition ... or the acquisition
of a significant amount of assets ... changes in accounting principles or practices or [their
application which have a material effect] ... seasonal or other specified factors contribut-
ing to an unusual increase or decrease in net sales or income and material retroactive adjust-
ments . . ." Financial Reporting---Quarterly and Other Interim Reports of Operations,
SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9559 (April 5, 1972), corrected, SEC Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 9559A (April 21, 1972), [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCII Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. II 78,692, at 81,459.
Other examples include Bowman & Bourdon, Inc. v. Rohr, 296 F. Supp. 847, 851 (D.
Mass.), aff'd per curiam, 417 F.2d 780 (1st Cir. 1969) (inventory misleading unless details
of how computed given) ; Notice to Registrants Engaged in Defense and Other Long-Term
Contracts of the Need for Disclosure of Material Information, SEC Securities Exchange
Act Release No. 9650 (June 22, 1972), [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. ff 78,852, at 81,865 (must make proper disclosure in financial statements, and also in
text where necessary).
132. Note, Accountants, Financial Disclosure and Investors' Remedies, 18 N.Y.L.F. 681
(1973) ("misleading presentations, misapplication of accounting principles or inadequate
disclosure" actionable. Id. at 694); see Green v. Jonhop, Inc., 358 F. Supp. at 419 (failure
to make reference to footnote elsewhere in financial statement) ; Koch Indus., Inc. v. Vosko,
[1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ff 93,705, at 93,104-06, 93,133 (D.
Kan. 1972) (failure to break out accounts receivable from affiliated companies). Compare
Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Independent Stockholders Comm., [1972-1973 Transfer Binder]
CCII Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ff 93,766, at 93,352 (D. Del 1973) (proxy rules; no misrepresenta-
tion found when statement made that division operated profitably but overhead not al-
located to division; court relied on questionable ground that overhead could be allocated
arbitrarily).
133. SEC v. Keller Indus., Inc., [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCtI Fed. See. L. Rep. V
93,453, at 92,237-38 & n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
134. Gottlieb v. Sandia Am. Corp., 452 F.2d 510, 515 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
938 (1971).
135. SEC Policy Statement on Conflicting Financial Reports and Earnings Computa-
tions, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8336 (June 18, 1968), [1967-1969 Transfer
Binder] CCII Fed. Sec. L. Rep. fI 77,567, at 83,196. This is the right result, but a different
conclusion was reached in Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Independent Stockholders Comm.,
[1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCII Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ff 93,766, at 93,352 (D. Del. 1973).
136. SEC Release No. 8336, supra note 135, [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCII Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. at 83,196-97.
137. See notes 22-30 infra and accompanying text. The most famous example, which
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Cases also have provided guidance regarding particular balance sheet
items. For example, the size of a reserve is unassailable if determined
using reasonable business judgment or generally accepted accounting
principles,"" but arbitrary conclusions will not be condoned.13 Sim-
ilarly, a corporation must write down an investment's artificially-created
carrying value when it has notice that the value is substantially in excess
of market value; 40 however, this rule does not necessarily apply to a
carrying value determined in accord with conventional "transactional"
accounting.'l Thirdly, contingent liabilities should be disclosed if ma-
terial; one case, relying on SEC instructions for S-1 registration state-
ments, used a figure equal to 15 percent of current assets as a guide to
whether disclosure was needed.14 And municipal bonds should not be
carried as current assets if the parties who agreed to buy the bonds from
the issuer could not perform, interest payments on the bonds were de-
linquent, or no market for the bonds existed. 4 3
C. Intention and Promises
Not a few cases have held that a misrepresentation of one's intention
is actionable." Yet this is but the beginning of the inquiry into the
issue of intention and promises.
contains a detailed discussion, is Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 656-71
(S.DN.Y. 1968) (interpreting 1933 Act § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970)).
138. Colonial Realty Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., 337 F. Supp. 546, 552 (S.D.N.Y. 1971),
quoting Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. at 666 (construing 1933 Act § 11,
15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970)); Kohler v. Kohler Co., 203 F. Supp. 808, 817 (E.D. Wis. 1962),
aff'd, 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963). See also Republic Tech. Fund, Inc. v. Lionel Corp.,
345 F. Supp. 656, 662 (SJ.DN.Y. 1972), rev'd, 483 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1973) (timing of
adjustments).
139. SEC v. Keller Indus., Inc., [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 9
93,453, at 92,237-38 & n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
140. SEC v. Bangor Punta Corp., 331 F. Supp. at 1161-62. See also Chris-Craft Indus.,
Inc. v. Independent Stockholders Comm., [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. II 93,766, at 93,351 (D. Del. 1973) (can carry investment in another enterprise at
cost if value not permanently impaired; even if no permanent impairment, must disclose
problems of corporation held as investment).
141. SEC v. Bangor Punta Corp., 331 F. Supp. at 1162.
142. Prettner v. Aston, 339 F. Supp. 273, 290 (D. Del 1972). The 15 percent figure on
which the court relied has been reduced to ten percent. SEC Form S-1 Registration State-
ment, Item 12.
143. Filtrol Corp., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9536 (M1arch 20, 1972),
[1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 9 78,669.
144. Richardson v. MacArthur, 451 F.2d 35, 40-41 (10th Cir. 1971) (intent to convert
stock); Robinson v. Cupples Container Co., 316 F. Supp. 1362, 1366 (NJ). Cal. 1970);
Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 298 F. Supp. at 94; Electronic Specialty Co. v. Interna-
tional Controls Corp., 295 F. Supp. 1063, 1078 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), modified, 409 F.2d 937
(2d Cir. 1969); Keers & Co. v. American Steel & Pump Corp., 234 F. Supp. 201, 203
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Intentions can be classified as express, concealed, or implied. The first
is exemplified by an announced intent to list a security on a specified
national securities exchange 45 or a statement by A to B that C intends
to perform an act. 46
Concealed intentions must be announced only if they constitute inside
information and the defendant is under a duty to disclose.14 Thus, a
purchase of stock by an issuer not revealing its intent to liquidate and
realize on its undervalued assets would be actionable. 48
Intentions also can be implied from defendant's actions or words.
Hence, the defendant may make a statement or take actions which
would be misleading unless his intent were disclosed. Rule 10b-5 deci-
sions have recognized the implied intent arising when parties enter into
a contract or understanding. The parties seldom expressly represent that
they intend to fulfill their contractual obligations. For instance, a cus-
tomer might instruct his broker to buy one hundred shares of I.B.M.
stock for his account without stating that he intends to pay on the settle-
ment date. Nevertheless, courts have permitted the broker to recover
under Rule 10b-5 if the customer, when he placed his order, did not
intend to pay for the stock if its value declined by the settlement date,
and if in fact he did not pay.4 9 The duty to disclose inside information
(S.D.N.Y. 1964) (one's state of mind is a fact); see Allen v. H.K. Porter Co., 452 F.2d
675, 677-79 (10th Cir. 1971) (plaintiff did not prove that representation by defendant of
intent to foreclose was false or that defendant concealed intent to inject new capital);
Armstrong v. Sailboat Marine, Inc., [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 11
93,105 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) (no evidence that there was fraud "in the sense that [defendants]
stated intentions that did not exist." Id. at 91,049); Lester v. Preco Indus., Inc., 282 F.
Supp. 459, 462-64 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (can have cause of action from misrepresentation of
intent but no cause of action under these facts; plaintiff alleged concealment in registra-
tion statement of intent to carry out certain acts later); note 153 infra; cf. Oklahoma-
Texas Trust v. SEC, 100 F.2d 888, 894 (10th Cir. 1939) (1933 Act § 8(d), 15 U.S.C. §
77h(d) (1970)).
145. E.g., Were v. Mack, [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ff 92,956,
at 90,522 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
146. Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 734 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951
(1968) (misrepresentation of another's intent or state of mind).
147. See 37 Fordhan L. Rev. 483, 487-91 (1969).
148. See notes 164-75 infra and accompanying text.
149. As to purchases from broker-dealers, see, e.g., United States v. Bialkin, 331 F.2d
956, 957-58 (2d Cir. 1964). Intent not to pay for securities purchased from other persons
has also been held to be actionable. Walling v. Beverly Enterprises, 476 F.2d 393, 396-97
(9th Cir. 1973); SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1097 n.19 (2d Cir.
1972) (from underwriters); Richardson v. Salinas, 336 F. Supp. 997, 1001-02 (N.D. Tex.
1972) (from private citizen). Similarly, a seller concealing his intent not to sell is also in
violation of lob-S. See Commerce Reporting Co. v. Puretec, Inc., 290 F. Supp. 715, 719-20
(S.D.N.Y. 1968) (analyzing the situation along lines of lack of intent to perform).
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is one possible justification for finding l0b-5 liability in such a case.
Under traditional thinking, however, only an insider' 0 with inside in-
formation has the duty to disclose. The customer is not an insider, nor is
his state of mind inside information. Therefore, he would have no duty to
disclose his concealed intent. A better analysis is that his intent to per-
form his obligations-to pay the amount due in this situation--can be
presumed from his entering into the contract.' 5 The Rule is breached if
this presumption of intent to fulfill the contract's terms was incorrect at
the time the contract was made.112 The "in connection with the . . .
sale of any security" clause of the Rule is satisfied when the defendant
carries out his preconceived intent not to consummate the sale.
An express statement of intent must be correct when made and an
implied intent must be true when it is implied.5 The Rule generally
would not be violated merely because the representer subsequently
changed his mind. 54 But he should be liable for failing to convey his
150. An insider is a short-hand designation of persons who have a duty to disclose,
for example, corporate officers, directors, and controlling shareholders. 37 Fordham L.
Rev. 483, 491 (1969).
151. Restatement of Torts § 530, comment b (1938); see Weisman v. MCA, Inc., 45
FYD. 258. 263-64 (D. Del. 1968) (legal imposition of good faith and fair dealing on
security sellers at time of sale); Voege v. American Sumatra Tobacco Corp., 241 F. Supp.
369, 375 (D. Del. 1965).
152. Note that a concealed intent not to fulfill the terms of the contract would be
material under any definition. On the other hand, disclosure of the intent not to perform
would obviate any recovery by the other party to the agreement.
The same result regarding a breach of contract can be reached by viewing contracts as
mutual promises to perform certain acts. Making a promise to perform an action is a 10b-5
infraction if the promisor had no intention of keeping the promise. See note 158 infra and
accompanying text. Cf. Entel v. Allen, 270 F. Supp. 60, 70 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), which seems
to have gone too far, albeit reluctantly, in holding that any undisclosed breach of state
contract law is actionable.
153. Desser v. Ashton, [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. I 92,546, at
98,508 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Commerce Reporting Co. v. Puretec, Inc., 290 F. Supp. at 720;
see Richardson v. MacArthur, 451 F.2d at 40 (fact question as to whether just a breach of
contract or a 10b-5 violation); Bowers v. Columbia Gen. Corp., 336 F. Supp. 609, 626 (D.
DeL 1971). It does not follow that an intent was misrepresented merely because the actor
subsequently did not perform. Restatement of Torts § 530, comment c (1938); see note
154 infra and accompanying text.
Despite the language about a contract in Voege v. American Sumatra Tobacco Corp, 241
F. Supp. at 374-75, this case also could be classified properly as an implied representation
decisioft.
154. Shemtob v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 448 F.2d 442, 445 (2d Cir. 1971) (breach
of contract insufficient); Manus v. Bank of Bermuda, Ltd., [1971-1972 Transfer Binder]
CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. fI 93,299, at 91,650 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (same); Pepsico, Inc. v. W.R.
Grace & Co., 307 F. Supp. 713, 720 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (complaint dismissed where allegation
of change of intent after contract was signed) ; see Allico Nat'l Corp. v. Amalgamated Meat
Cutters & Butcher Workmen of N. America, 397 F.2d 727, 729-30 (7th Cir. 1968) (decision
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change of heart to a plaintiff who thereafter made an investment deci-
sion, and whom the defendant knew or should have known was relying
on his intent.'55 A defendant also violates the Rule if he defers or delays
a planned course of action in order to cover up his misrepresented or
concealed intent. 5 6
Other types of statements are treated in the same way as intention, in
that they must accurately represent the speaker's view when made. Thus,
a person expressing an opinion must hold the opinion; 1' one predicting
an event has to think the prediction will come true; a promisor must in-
tend to perform his promise,' 58 and a person recommending the purchase
or sale of a security must believe his advice is correct.""
Intent cannot be proved by psychoanalysis; it is a question of fact
to be determined by evaluation of external occurrences. 00 Events taking
leaves unanswered the question whether breach of contract alone is sufficient to create
liability); Richardson v. Salinas, 336 F. Supp. at 1001-02 (court does not decide whether
failure to pay is breach of contract or lob-5 claim, but does not dismiss complaint);
Seward v. Hammond, 8 F.R.D. 457, 459 (D. Mass. 1948) (complaint characterized as one
for breach of contract rather than for fraud under the securities law).
155. See W. Prosser, Torts § 109, at 728-31 (4th ed. 1971).
156. SEC v. Bangor Punta Corp., 331 F. Supp. at 1160.
157. Walling v. Beverly Enterprises, 476 F.2d 393, 396 n.6 (9th Cir. 1973); Myzel v.
Fields, 386 F.2d at 734 n.8; United States v. Grayson, 166 F.2d 863, 866 (2d Cir. 1948)
(construing 1933 Act § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1970)); Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, 353
F. Supp. 795, 798-99 (W.D. Pa. 1973); Trussell v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp.
757, 769-70, 772 (D. Colo. 1964); Weinstein v. Zimet, [1961-1964 Transfer Binder] CCH
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ff 91,320, at 94,368 (S.D .N.Y. 1964).
158. Walling v. Beverly Enterprises, 476 F.2d at 396 n.6; Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270,
274 (9th Cir. 1961) (promise to share control); Commerce Reporting Co. v. Puretec, Inc.,
290 F. Supp. at 719-20 (refusal to sell); Kavit v. A.L. Stamm & Co., [1966-1967 Transfer
Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ff 91,915, at 96,125-26 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (recldess promises
and other actions by broker-dealer); Rustic v. Werblin, [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] CCH
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ff 91,637, at 95,376 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Keers & Co. v. American Steel &
Pump Corp., 234 F. Supp. 201, 203 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (need lack of intention to perform at
time promise made); Trussell v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. at 769-70, 772;
see M.L. Lee & Co. v. American Cardboard & Packaging Corp., 424 F.2d 532, 534 (3d Cir.
1970) (decision leaves open the question of whether unfulfilled promise in letter of intent is
actionable); Whitlow & Associates, Ltd. v. Intermountain Brokers, Inc., 252 F. Supp. 943,
948 (D. Hawaii 1966) (promise is a material representation); cf. United States v. Grayson,
166 F.2d at 866 (construing 1933 Act § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)). See note 152 supra
regarding the relationship between concealment of intent, and promises which are not in-
tended to be performed.
It seems to follow that promising to perform an act the promisor knows or should know
is impossible should also be a lob-5 violation if the impossibility is not readily apparent to
the promisee.
159. See United States v. Grayson, 166 F.2d at 866.
160. Richardson v. MacArthur, 451 F.2d 35, 40 (10th Cir. 1971). A corporation's intent
is ascertained from the actions of its officers. Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 298 F. Supp.
at 93.
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place after defendant's intent was represented can be used as evidence
in finding whether his representation was true when made.' Thus, in
the absence of an intervening event which could justify the defendant's
change of heart, the more pronounced the alteration from the original
intent and the shorter the period between the representation and the
change, the stronger the inference that the original representation was
false.'62 Events intervening between the time the intent was represented
and the time when the defendant changed his mind could be either un-
foreseeable, unforeseen but foreseeable, or foreseen. An unforeseeable
intervening event is the strongest evidence a defendant could present to
justify his change of intent, while a foreseen occurrence is the weakest.e
One type of intent deservedly has received a great deal of attention-
the intent of a purchaser of a corporation's stock' 4 to take advantage of
the excess of the market value of the corporation's assets over their book
value.'65 Misleading disclosure of such intent and, under certain cir-
161. Walling v. Beverly Enterprises, 476 F.2d at 397 n.8; SEC v. Glass farine Indus.,
Inc., 208 F. Supp. 727, 732-33 (D. Del. 1962).
162. 208 F. Supp. at 732, 740-42; cf. W. Prosser, Torts § 109, at 729-31 (4th ed. 1971).
But a defendant will not be held liable merely because he changes his intent for what
others may consider to be an inadequate reason. Restatement of Torts § 530, comment a
(1933).
163. See Weisman v. Ashplant, 326 F. Supp. 825, 826-27 & n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (de-
fendant stated intent to list a security, and received a preliminary indication of permission
from the exchange; earnings then dropped and listing was denied; held that plaintiff failed
to prove defendant's lack of intent to list, although event was foreseeable) ; Were v. Mack,
[1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. U 92,956, at 90,523 (S.D.N.Y. 1971)
(not misleading to state intent to list securities on American Stock Exchange when listing
subsequently denied because of unpublished standards of the exchange; viewed in light
most favorable to plaintiff, event foreseeable but not foreseen).
164. Of course, this concept is not limited to securities of corporations. And the same
principles apply to debt securities where there is a question whether the underlying assets
would be sufficient to pay the debt in full upon liquidation.
165. The same result would obtain when the market value of all assets exceeds book
value, or when the disparity in value is found in only some assets regardless of whether a
disparity exists in the assets as a whole.
Among the factors which can be used to determine whether market value exceeds book
value are good faith offers of others to buy, and appraisals "by qualified experts [when the
appraisals] have sufficient basis in fact." Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 298 F. Supp. at
92. The corporation's own asking price is not of the same weight. Id.; accord, In re Brown
Co. Sec. Litigation, 355 F. Supp. 574, 583-84 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
Although a liquldation or other method of realizing on the discrepancy between the mar-
ket value and book value is not planned by management, management can point out this
discrepancy to stockholders to demonstrate the inadequacy of a tender offeror's price. Gulf
& W. Indus., Inc. v. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 356 F. Supp. at 1071.
The principles set forth here, as applicable to insiders when market exceeds book value,
should also pertain when an insider sells knowing that there is an undisclosed excess of




cumstances, concealment of intent are both actionable.00 Misrepresenta-
tion of intent has assumed increased importance since 1968, when section
13 (d) of the 1934 Act was adopted.0 7 Under that section, a person ac-
quiring equity securities registered under the 1934 Act who thereafter
owns more than five percent of the shares of a class must file a schedule"'
disclosing his plans to liquidate the issuer, sell its assets, or merge it
with another entity. Misrepresentations of plans in the schedule should
be 10b-5 violations.
Whether a purchaser must disclose his intent when section 13 (d) is
inapplicable depends on two sets of variables: is he or is he not either an
insider of the issuer or a person seeking to gain control; and does he or
does he not intend to take advantage of the excess? A purchasing in-
sider's intent to liquidate the corporation, sell its assets, merge or con-
solidate it with another entity, or engage in any other act to take ad-
vantage of the disparity in prices, is probably not inside information
since he did not receive it by access to the corporation. But the disparity
in asset values is inside information if he learned it because of his con-
tact with the issuer and it is not publicly known. When inside informa-
tion, not necessarily important by itself, becomes important in combina-
tion with other data (for example, the combination of the disparity in
values with the insider's intent to liquidate), the combination is material
inside information and therefore a purchasing insider must disclose both.
The cases reach this result, although often without detailing the reason-
ing behind it.' But an insider (and a fortiori an outsider) might be
166. Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951).
167. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1970).
168. Item 4 to Schedule 13D under the 1934 Act, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (1973). One
case discussing this point is Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 296
F. Supp. at 468 (motion for preliminary injunction).
169. In re Brown Co. Sec. Litigation, 355 F. Supp. at 583-84 (disclose only if intent to
dispose of assets plus either third party's offer to purchase or appraisals); Gerstie v.
Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 298 F. Supp. at 92 (proxy statement); Bosche v. Louart Corp.,
[1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ff 92,231, at 97,066-67 (N.D. Cal.
1968) (plan of stockholders to purchase more shares); Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99
F. Supp. at 825-26, 828 (written tender offer by majority stockholder); Ward La France
Truck Corp., 13 S.E.C. 373, 378-80 (1943) (purchases by insiders). See also Address by
former SEC Chairman William J. Casey before the Financial Executives Institute at Las
Vegas, Nevada, Oct. 18, 1972, in [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 10
79,045, at 82,265 (management should consider disclosing supplementally that book value
is less than market value, particularly if assets are liquid; no indication that tied Into
purchases by insiders).
Another method of approaching this problem is to consider the issuer's financial state-
ments misleading because the excess is not shown, at least where there is an intent to realize
on the excess. See notes 127-31 supra and accompanying text (explanation of financial state-
ments needed in some circumstances).
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able to purchase without disclosure if he does not intend to take advan-
tage of the excess. 1
70
A duty to disclose is more difficult to justify when an outsider seeking
control intends to realize on the excess of market over book value. He
has no duty when purchasing on the open market (or perhaps even pur-
suant to a formal cash tender offer, which contains no target-company
financial statements), because none of his data is inside information. 1
However, if there are any relevant financial statements which are part
of a registration statement or proxy statement used in an exchange offer
or merger, and if realization on the excess of disparity in values is in-
tended or can reasonably be anticipated, disclosure of the disparity must
be made to correct the misleading impression created by the financial
statements.172 By contrast, an outsider not seeking to gain control need
170. The fact would still be inside information vis-.-vis the insider, but the duty to
disclose would turn on the issue of materiality. However, the question of materiality does
not seem to explain the diverse results of the authorities on this point. In re Brown Co.
Sec. Litigation, 355 F. Supp. at 583-84 (disclose only if intent to dispose of assets plus either
third party's offer to purchase or appraisals; therefore, no duty to disclose when no intent
to sell assets, no intent to liquidate, and no appraisals) ; Lewis v. Bogin, 337 F. Supp. 331,
337-38 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (merger with parent; defendant did not know or have reason to
believe that asset would be sold at higher value, so no duty to disclose in proxy statement) ;
Kohler v. Kohler Co., 208 F. Supp. 808, 825-26 (E.D. Wis. 1962), aff'd, 319 F.2d 634 (7th
Cir. 1963) (no duty to disclose on part of purchasing issuer where no intent to liquidate) ;
Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. at 825-26 & n.9 (court: no duty of controlling
stockholder to disclose increase in inventory where no intent to liquidate; SEC as amicus
curiae: should disclose increase whether or not intent exists); Note, SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulfur Co.: The Inside and Outside of Rule 10b-5, 46 B.U.L. Rev. 205, 223 (1966) (intent
to liquidate is what renders difference in value material); Note, Purchaser's Duty to Dis-
close Under Securities and Exchange Commission Rule X-10B-5, 40 Blinn. L. Rev. 62, 70-71
(1955) (SEC's view in Speed preferable); Note, The Prospects for Rule X-10B-5: An
Emerging Remedy for Defrauded Investors, 59 Yale L.J. 1120, 1146 (1950) (should di-
close important difference in values if sale of assets is likely or if difference is permanent) ;
55 IML BJ. 688, 701 (1967) (without intent to liquidate, probably do not have to disclose);
see Becker v. Schenley Indus., Inc., [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
9 93,669, at 92,986-87 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (court seems to indicate that disclosure is necessary
only if negotiations have begun). See also CMC Corp. v. Kern County Land Co., 290 F.
Supp. 695, 696 (NI). Cal. 1968) (disclosure sufficient if it merely states assets are worth
much more than book value).
171. Mfills v. Sarlem Corp., 133 F. Supp. 753, 764-65 (D.N.J. 19SS). Courts have not
implied a representation that no liquidation is planned. Compare notes 149-52 supra and
accompanying text. As to the issue of whether a bid for stock at a given price is a repre-
sentation that the bid is the true value, see notes 188, 196 infra and accompanying text.
Implying a duty on the outsider to correct a misleading impression created by the com-
bination of the published target-company financial statements plus his intent to realize on
the difference is one argument which plaintiffs could put forward.
172. Brudney, A Note on Chilling Tender Solicitations, 21 Rutgers L. Rev. 609, 635
nn.59, 61 (1967) (permissible to buy through broker, but not through tender offer where
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not disclose the excess when purchasing, since other outsiders can eval-
uate the situation as well as he can. 78
Closed-end investment companies form a good example of a case where
the difference between market value and book value is known publicly." 4
Lacking some type of misstatement or half-truth, an insider or outsider
purchasing shares in a fund which has a disclosed excess of net asset
value over market value need not announce his intent to liquidate.7
D. Motive
The question of motive is closely related to that of intent.
Misrepresentation of a defendant's motive should be actionable if the
motive is material. Concealment of a motive can arise in any context, but
has been discussed most often in mismanagement cases.17 The majority
of opinions do not require that motives be disclosed so long as all the
facts surrounding the transaction are revealed. 7 For example, a buyer
of a security could not complain if he knows all material facts about an
financial statement is made; should disclose to correct corporation's financial statements);
see Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 298 F. Supp. at 91-92 (majority stockholder merging
subsidiary into itself; question of adequate disclosure in financial statements which are part
of merger proxy statement); notes 127-31 supra and accompanying text (disclosure in text
sometimes necessary to supplement financial statements).
173. This assumes the outsider reached his conclusion based on his analysis of publicly
available information. However, where he learned from an insider about the disparity in
values or, perhaps, about the insider's intent to liquidate, the outsider would be a tippee
to the extent he received "inside information." Similar data received by the outsider from
another outsider could, at best, be considered "inside information" only when the original
tippee had a duty to disclose.
174. Newspapers disclose daily the net asset value and market value of many mutual
funds.
175. The argument concerning the material effect of the combining of intention to
liquidate with the inside information regarding the disparity in values is not here tenable
because the disparity is public information. See Fleischer & Mundheim, Corporate Acquisi-
tion by Tender Offer, 115 U. Pa. L. Rev. 317, 334-35 (1967) (need disclose only when
board thinks there is a reasonable probability that there will be liquidation).
176. See Jacobs, supra note 5, for a discussion of Rule lob-5 and mismanagement.
177. Segal v. Gordon, 467 F.2d 602, 609 (2d Cir. 1972); Krafcisin v. LaSale Madison
Hotel Co., [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ff 93,586, at 92,728-29 (N.D.
Ill. 1972) (do not have to disclose purpose of proposed dissolution) ; Crane Co. v. American
Standard Inc., [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. Ii 92,228, at 97,060 (S.D.
N.Y. 1968), modified on other grounds sub nom. Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co.,
419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970); see Abramson v. Nytronics,
Inc., 312 F. Supp. 519, 526 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (do not have to present contentions of both
sides as long as stockholders get all material facts); cf. Note, Securities Regulation: Rule
10b-5 Under Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Held Not To Require Privity for Private
Recovery, 1963 Duke L.J. 796, 801 (motive must be disclosed only when there is intent to
mislead and self-interest).
enterprise, even though he is not told that the seller's motive for the
transaction is to invest the proceeds in a better security of an unrelated
issuer. An evil motive is in no case actionable unless translated into
deeds.'
None of the foregoing permits concealment of management's conflicts
of interest." 9
E. Concealment, Disclosure, and Fairness
Fairness can interact with concealment and disclosure in three situa-
tions: when adequate disclosure is not made of a fair transaction; when
all material facts about an unfair deal are revealed; and when a trans-
action is expressly represented to be fair.
The Supreme Court rejected the fairness of a transaction as a defense
to faulty disclosure under the proxy rules.18 0 As the Court pointed out,
any other result would "insulate from private redress an entire category
of proxy violations-those relating to matters other than the terms of the
[deal] ."18
The situation is more controversial where all material facts are dis-
closed but the unfairness of the transaction is not mentioned.'Ve No one
seriously contends that a cause of action then arises if the transaction is
at arm's length: the buyer and seller have equal access to data, and
neither party reposes trust or confidence in the other. The same result
does not follow necessarily where one party is a fiduciary, has greater
access to facts, or enjoys the other's trust and confidence.a A brokerage
firm, for example, owes its customer a fiduciary duty, and the law in
effect requires it to disclose any unfairness to him; 8 however, this is
not controlling in other circumstances since 10b-5 places special obliga-
178. Stedman v. Storer, 308 F. Supp. 881, 887 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
179. See note 106 supra and accompanying text.
180. AM v. Electric Auto-LAte Co, 396 U.S. 375, 381-82 (1970); accord, Colonial
Realty Corp. v. Baldwin-Montrose Chem. Co., 312 F. Supp. 1296, 1299 (E.D. Pa. 1970);
cf. Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 572-73 (E.D.N.Y. 1971)
(construing 1933 Act § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970)). A fortiori, faulty disclosure of an un-
fair deal is also actionable.
181. 396 U.S. at 382.
182. This should be distinguished from a question raised in Lerman v. Tenney, 295 F.
Supp. 780 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), modified, 425 F.2d 336 (2d Cir. 1970). There, plaintiff claimed
that a partnership did not disclose that it paid too much for its only asset, a building. Thus,
the question of fairness related to a transaction in which the issuer engaged, and not the
purchase or sale of a security on which suit was brought. It is altogether proper to recognize
this as a lob-5 claim since the essence of the allegation relates to the value of the issuer's
assets.
183. Cf. Restatement of Torts § 542 (1938).




tions on broker-dealers."1 5 The issue also has arisen in the mismanage-
ment area, mainly with proxy statements. The Second Circuit has held
that concealment of a merger's unfairness as such is not actionable even
if a conflict of interests exists;1 80 however, lower courts in that circuit
sometimes have reached a different result 8 7 and other courts of appeals
may disagree. The Second Circuit's decision suggests that an insider can-
not be criticized for concealing the unfairness of the price at which he
buys or sells securities. Yet, cases indicate that there may be an implied
representation of fairness regarding a price at which trades are made by
an insider, a person having greater access to facts, or someone occupy-
ing a position of trust.188 Perhaps these two apparently conflicting con-
cepts can be reconciled as follows: an insider has no duty to disclose that
a price is unfair if the price is established by the market or at the out-
sider's suggestion, but the insider may impliedly represent fairness when
he sets the price.
The final situation is an express statement that a transaction is fair.
Such a statement is an opinion governed by the rules pertaining to opin-
ions generally.18 9 An opinion of an investment banking firm regarding
the fairness to a company's stockholders of a merger or other transaction
is one example of an express representation l0 Also, directors may rep-
resent that a deal is fair or state that in their opinion it is fair; however,
a board's mere recommendation to stockholders to vote in favor of a
transaction should not as such be an implied representation that the deal
in fact is fair.191 A statement that a merger is fair is unassailable if
185. See generally Jacobs, supra note 3, at 871.
186. Popkin v. Bishop, 464 F.2d 714, 718-20 (2d Cir. 1972) (injunction action), noted
in 41 Fordham L. Rev. 742 (1973); see Hirschleifer v. Fran-Tronics Corp., [1972-1973
Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ff 93,681, at 93,030 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (plaintiff
attacks wisdom of accepting offer but this is not actionable misrepresentation or fraud);
cf. Allen v. Penn Cent. Co., 350 F. Supp. at 702 (proxy rules do not give mandate to pass
on wisdom of a proposal). Contra, Cox, Fraud Is in the Eyes of the Beholder: Rule 10b-S's
Application to Acts of Corporate Mismanagement, 47 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 674, 696 (1972).
187. Hoff v. Sprayregen, 339 F. Supp. 369, 374 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (must disclose excessive
fee); Heit v. Davis, [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 1 91,698, at
95,567 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) ("may" be misleading to state amount without revealing that It Is
excessive).
188. See note 196 infra and accompanying text (implied statements).
189. See Part III-G infra.
190. The issue of an investment banker's liability for his opinion on fairness was raised
in Mills v. Sarjem Corp., 133 F. Supp. at 766-67, but the court did not directly decide
whether the firm would be liable since it held the transaction was fair.
191. While the recommendation is not an implied representation of fairness, the proxy
statement or the document would contain a half-truth if the board believed the deal to be
unfair. See notes 13-14 supra and accompanying text, concerning half-truths.
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the opinion accurately reflects the speaker's views, is based on a reason-
able investigation, and the transaction is in fact fair.0 2
F. Implied Statements
Rule 10b-5 could cover two types of implied statements. First, a per-
son should be responsible for inferences reasonable investors would draw
from what he said or did. This is much akin to half-truths.
0 3
More difficult is whether the law will imply representations merely
because of a person's position, without his specific words or acts as a
basis. The "shingle theory" is a vehicle for implying a plethora of rep-
resentations by broker-agents and by dealer-principals who have gained
their customers' confidence. 4 This concept cannot be imported in toto
into other areas covered by 10b-5, although it does serve as an analogy.
The Supreme Court touched on this subject in a case where defrauded
sellers sued bank employees who purchased securities from them. Rely-
ing on a broker-dealer case, the Court held:
The individual defendants [the bank employees], in a distinct sense, were market
makers .... This being so, they possessed the affirmative duty under the Rule to
disclose this fact to the ... sellers. It is no answer to urge that ... these defend-
ants may have made no positive representation or recommendation. The defendants
may not stand mute while they facilitate the . . sales to those seeking to profit in
the . .. market the defendants had developed and encouraged and with which they
were fully familiar. The sellers had the right to know that the defendants were in a
position to gain financially from their sales and that their shares were selling for a
higher price in that market.195
This quotation, along with whatever applicability the shingle theory has,
suggests that representations might be implied where one party is a
fiduciary of the other, has greater access to information, or enjoys the
confidence of the other by virtue of their relationship or prior dealings.
Courts have adopted this approach by indicating that an insider some-
times impliedly represents to the other person that the price at which
192. Nanfito v. Tekseed Hybrid Co., 473 F.2d 537, 542-43 (8th Cir. 1973).
193. See notes 13-14 supra and accompanying text concerning half-truths, and note 56
supra and accompanying text concerning the practice of construing ambiguities against the
speaker.
194. For a discussion of the shingle theory see 3 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 1482-93
(2d ed. 1961); Jacobs, supra note 3, at 876-81.
195. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 US. at 153 (emphasis added) (cita-
tions omitted). The Court made clear that this was not based on broker-dealer principles.
Id. at 154 n.16. This quotation is, of course, on a somewhat different issue (ie., whether
disclosure must be made by a market maker of a market at a higher price), but it is still
authority for the proposition for which it is cited.
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they are trading is fair.' Other representations have also been implied,"'
but some courts have refused to do so in certain situations.9 8
196. Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. at 843; Daum & Phillips, The Implica-
tions of Cady, Roberts, 17 Bus. Law. 939, 947-48 (1962); Leech, Transactions in Corporate
Control, 104 U. Pa. L. Rev. 725, 770 n.124 (1956); Note, Purchaser's Duty to Disclose
Under Securities and Exchange Commission Rule X-10B-5, 40 Minn. L. Rev. 62, 68, 70 &
n.62 (1955); see Reynolds v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 309 F. Supp. at 558; Flelscher &
Mundheim, Corporate Acquisition by Tender Offer, 115 U. Pa. L. Rev. 317, 338-39 (1967).
The broadness of the Speed holding is tempered somewhat by the court's prior statements.
99 F. Supp. at 829-30. The SEC's view is in accord with the text. Complaint in SEC v.
Aldred Inv. Trust, [1961-1964 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. fI 91,349,
at 94,490 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
In List v. Fashion Park, Inc., the Second Circuit refused to consider plaintiff-seller's con-
tention that the defendant-insider-buyer impliedly represented that the price was fair In
an over-the-counter trade where plaintiff was unaware that the buyer was an insider. The
court's rationale for failing to discuss the issue was that plaintiff raised it for the first time
on appeal and the allegation "raises substantial issues of fact . .. such as the ascertain-
ment of the true value of plaintiff's shares on [the date of the sale]." 340 F.2d at 461. This
disposition suggests that the representation is implied in at least some circumstances; were
it otherwise, the court could have disposed of the issue as a matter of law. The sales price
in List was negotiated between the buyer and the seller. 227 F. Supp. at 907-08. If the
representation was implied in the List case, arising in an over-the-counter trade where
plaintiff did not know the buyer was an insider, a fortiori it would be implied in other
outsider-insider cases where the parties knew one another. Cf. Chiodo v. General Water-
works Corp., 380 F.2d 860, 867 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1004 (1967) (no repre-
sentation to selling insider by buying outsider).
On the other hand, many reported cases involving purchases by insiders do not discuss
the issue of implied misrepresentation. Yet occasionally in such opinions, the courts have
been careful to point out that the selling stockholder initiated the trade and the result
might have been different had the stockholder been approached initially by the purchasing
insider or had he negotiated the price with the insider. Hafner v. Forest Laboratories, Inc.,
345 F.2d 167, 168 (2d Cir. 1965); see Kohler v. Kohler Co., 208 F. Supp. 808, 821-22 (E.D.
Wis. 1962), aff'd, 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963).
197. Abramson v. Burroughs Corp., [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
II 93,456, at 92,254 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (investor can assume he will get reasonable notice of
redemption); E.L. Aaron & Co., Inc. v. Free, 55 F.R.D. 401, 402-03 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (sub
silento that presentment of check is implied representation that check is good); SEC v.
Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 340 F. Supp. at 934 (implied representation that funds in
account to back up check for payment of securities); Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99
F. Supp. at 829 (citing cases); Peskind, Regulation of the Financial Press: A New Dimen-
sion to Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, 14 St. Louis U.L.J. 80, 89 (1969) (could imply
representation of disinterestedness); see Reynolds v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 309 F. Supp.
at 558 ("implied misrepresentation can be just as fraudulent as an express one . . . ." Id.).
198. For example, while the presentation of financial statements usually carries with It
the implied representation not only that they were true as of their date but also that there
has been no material change since then, this is not always the case. Lane v. Midwest Banc-
shares Corp., 337 F. Supp. 1200, 1210 (E.D. Ark. 1972).
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G. Opinions and Forecasts
The final category is a class of statements which might loosely be
called opinions and forecasts. This includes recommendations to buy or
sell a security, opinions or estimates as to the present or the future status
of an event, projections and predictions of future occurrences, and rep-
resentations that an incident will take place. The courts have begun to
clarify the law in this area.
Each of these statements is a "fact" within the ambit of the Rule,'
199. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Bangor Punta Corp., 426 F.2d 569, 579 (2d Cir. 1970)
(concurring opinion) (the Rule covers "information" which does not fit easily into cate-
gories of either "fact" or "opinion"); Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d at 734 n.8; Royal Air
Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 312 F.2d 210, 212 (9th Cir. 1962) (misleading profit estimates);
SEC v. American Plan Inv. Corp., [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCII Fed. Sec. L. Rep. U
93,769, at 93,361 (CD. Cal. 1972) (consent order enjoining misleading projections); Dolgow
v. Anderson, 53 F.R.D. at 670, 676-79; Gordon v. Lipoff, 320 F. Supp. 905, 917 (W.D. Mo.
1970) (quoting Myzel v. Fields, supra); Sprayregen v. Livingston Oil Co., 295 F. Supp.
1376, 1377-78 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (false statements on projected profits); SEC v. Glen Alden
Corp., [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. II 92,280, at 97,342-43 (S.D.
N.Y. 1968) (tipping of projections); Fischer v. Kletz, 249 F. Supp. 539, 541 (S.D.N.Y.
1966) (inflated earnings forecast disseminated both to public and to regulatory agency);
Nicewarner v. Bleavins, 244 F. Supp. 261, 264 (D. Colo. 1965) (statements about ex-
pected profits, likelihood of success of venture, etc., not shown to be in bad faith by the
evidence); SEC v. Broadwall Sec., Inc., 240 F. Supp. 962, 968 (S.DN.Y. 1965) (broker-
dealer's predictions and opinions as to future market prices of stock); Freed v. Szabo Food
Serv., Inc., [1961-1964 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 1 91,317, at 94,363-2 to
94,363-3 (ND. Ill. 1964) (misrepresentation of future earnings); Statement by the Com-
mission on Disclosure of Projections of Future Economic Performance, SEC Securities Ex-
change Act Release No. 9984 (Feb. 2, 1973), [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. fl 79,211 [hereinafter cited as Release 9984]; Mates Fin. Servs., SEC Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 8836 (Mar. 9, 1970), [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. ff 77,790 (tipping of sales, earnings, and earnings projections); Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Penner & Smith, Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8459 (Nov. 25,
1968), [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 1 77,629 (tipped earnings and
earnings projections); Statement by former SEC Chairman William J. Casey on Earnings
Forecasts and Projections, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. U 79,211,
at 82,666 (Feb. 2, 1973); Latty, The Aggrieved Buyer or Seller or Holder of Shares in a
Close Corporation Under the S.E.C. Statutes, 18 Law & Contemp. Prob. 505, 526 (1953).
See Milberg v. Western Pac. R.R., 51 F.R.D. at 282 (dictum) (good faith estimate of
earnings not actionable); cf. United States v. Grayson, 166 F.2d 863, 866 (2d Cir. 1948)
(1933 Act § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1970)).
Contra, Chiodo v. General Waterworks Corp., 380 F.2d 860 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 1004 (1967) (statement "could not rise to the height of a false representation, it could
be nothing more than an expression of opinion." Id. at 867). The result in Chiodo can
perhaps be explained by the facts: the long-term owner of a business alleged he was mis-
led by the buyer's representation of its worth; that is, an outsider misled an owner about
the owner's own property. But the court's correct result when finding in favor of the buyer
could better have been achieved by dismissing the complaint on the grounds of unjustified
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so the issue of when they are misleading must be considered. Statements
concerning the future2°° are misleading if they are not believed by the
speaker when made.201 They are also misleading if they do not have a
reasonable basis,20 a point which bears further discussion. While a rea-
sonable basis is necessary for all the statements mentioned above, the
preponderance of 10b-5 opinions in this area concerns a broker-dealer
recommending a security.2 3 Three separate duties comprise a reasonable
basis: (1) to make a reasonable investigation; (2) to disclose lack of
knowledge regarding the issuer, and (3) to reveal data indicating that
the recommendation is incorrect. The first of the three, a reasonable in-
reliance. In Rogen v. Ilikon Corp., 250 F. Supp. 112, 117 (D. Mass.), rev'd on other
grounds, 361 F.2d 260, 267 (1st Cir. 1966), both courts concluded that an opinion, recog-
nized as such, was not actionable where plaintiff showed no reliance. Therefore, although
an opinion generally could be actionable, the plaintiff may not be able to demonstrate reli-
ance to the extent necessary. See also Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, 353 F. Supp. 795, 798
(W.D. Pa. 1973) (information equally accessible to both insiders). In Most v. Alleghany
Corp., [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ff 92,583, at 98,665 (S.DN.Y.
1970), the court held that an opinion as to the law is not actionable because the question
is one of opinion but not fact. This result, reached by relying on common-law authorities,
is questionable.
Projections of income and similar statements regarding the future meld with existing fact
when they relate to the current period. This would be the case, for instance, when a calen-
dar year company makes a projection in May for the first six months of the year. Cf. W.
Prosser, Torts § 109 (4th ed. 1971) (common law concerning opinion and intention).
There is some authority that statements regarding the future may be opinions or facts,
depending upon the circumstances. Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d at 734 n.8; Weinstein v.
Zimet, [1961-1964 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ff 91,320, at 94,368 (S.D.N.Y.
1964). Those authorities do not elaborate on the significance of the distinction. The result
seems too harsh if they are suggesting that some statements are facts and hence the speaker
is liable regardless of how carefully facts were gathered and analyzed to reach the con-
clusion. On the other hand, the cases make quite clear that they do not intend to exclude
opinion from the scope of the Rule. The Eighth Circuit in Myzel states that opinions are
sometimes actionable. 386 F.2d at 734 n.8; accord, Weinstein v. Zimet, supra at 94,368.
200. Cf. notes 221-26 infra and accompanying text concerning opinions and estimates of
existing facts.
201. See notes 157-59 supra and accompanying text.
202. Note that the test of reasonableness imposed on non-brokers does not depend upon
whether negligence is recognized as a basis for a 10b-S claim. Thus, the Second Circuit has
recognized the reasonable basis test--e.g., in Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft
Corp., 480 F.2d at 363-even though it rejected negligence actions as a basis for suit under
the Rule.
203. The SEC has indicated that a brokerage firm generally must have a reasonable
basis for its recommendation. Mac Robbins & Co., 41 S.E.C. 116, 119 (1962), aff'd sub nom.
Berko v. SEC, 316 F.2d 137 (2d Cir. 1963). One circuit has held that a broker violates
lob-5 when he makes a recommendation without a reasonable basis therefor. Hiller v.
SEC, 429 F.2d 856, 858 (2d Cir. 1970); Hanly v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589, 596 (2d Cir. 1969);
see 3A H. Bloomenthal, Securities and Federal Corporate Law § 12.09[2], at 12-50 (1972).
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vestigation, can in turn be divided into a responsibility to gather facts
and an obligation to evaluate them, 2 4 both under a standard of reason-
ableness. Rules established for broker-dealers cannot be incorporated
wholesale into all areas" 5 since brokers are held to a higher standard
than other persons. 06 This does not mean that a non-broker is excused
from making a reasonable investigation before recommending a secur-
ity.207 However, it does signify that the standard imposed on non-brokers
usually should be less than that prescribed for broker-dealers.
The reasonableness of an investigation is, of course, a question of fact.
Among the factors to be considered are the relationship between the
parties, the nature of the security, the amount of money involved, the
speaker's financial capacity to undertake an investigation, and his ability
to obtain facts because of his position with respect to the issuer. The
last two criteria indicate that the issuer should have a higher duty than
an outsider, since its organization is best able to accumulate and analyze
the facts about itself .20  A director or officer has freer access to facts
than an outsider but usually cannot match the issuer in this regard, so
his obligations should fall between those of the issuer and an outsider.
Regardless of who makes the assertion, one further factor should be con-
sidered for statements other than recommendations to buy or sell a
security. Such statements can pertain only to the corporation, 2 0 to a
204. Dolgow v. Anderson, 53 F.R.D. at 670, 676-79, contains an excellent, detailed dis-
cussion on one corporation's investigation to back-up its projections.
In the broker-dealer area, some information should tend to excite the broker's suspicion
and he, therefore, may not rely on that data. This principle should be equally applicable
to non-broker situations, though a lesser degree of financial sophistication on the part of
the investigator should be taken into account.
The commission has stated that projections would not be misleading if "reasonably based
in fact, prepared with reasonable care and carefully reviewed." Release 9984, at 82,668;
accord, Statement by former SEC Chairman William J. Casey on Earnings Forecasts and
Projections, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. U 79,211, at 82,666 (Feb.
2, 1973).
205. Accordingly, to the extent possible broker-dealer opinions have not been used in
this section.
206. See Jacobs, supra note 3, at 871.
207. SEC v. Chamberlain Associates, [1961-1964 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. ff 91,228, at 94,068-70 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). Non-brokers also have been held to have
reasonable basis duties. See authorities cited in note 212 infra.
208. Cf. Dolgow v. Anderson, 53 F.R.D. 664 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd per curiam, 464 F.2d
437 (2d Cir. 1972), where the court dismissed a claim relating to allegedly false projec-
tions made by a corporation because the internal estimates "were made honestly, were
reasonable, and were the best estimates of the people in [the corporation] most qualified to
make them." Id. at 676.
209. Examples would include earnings per share for the next year or the date on which
a new product will be offered for commercial sale.
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fact external to the issuer,210 or to a matter in between.211 The more
closely the statement relates to the issuer, the higher the standard should
be. This follows because the public has equal access to information neces-
sary to evaluate facts external to the issuer, but data concerning a par-
ticular company are not as readily available.
Under these guidelines, a speaker's duty to investigate may range
from very extensive to none at all. But no matter how little the extent of
the investigation required, the speaker would still have to reveal his lack
of knowledge regarding the company and convey any data indicating the
incorrectness of his statement.2 12 As a corollary, he must disclose assump-
tions on which any statement concerning the future necessarily must be
based only when they are different from what a reasonable listener would
expect. For example, if a projection is based on the assumption that cer-
tain unannounced acquisitions would be made, that assumption should
be disclosed. 13
Broker-dealer cases also indicate that there can be no reasonable basis
for predictions of very substantial and specific market price rises for the
stock of an unseasoned company, or for predictions of earnings for such
enterprises. 2 4 This theory should not be limited to brokerage firms. It
also follows that a statement made without a reasonable basis is never-
theless a 10b-5 infraction even though it fortuitously comes to pass.210
Private recovery would be inappropriate here because no one could show
injury, but the Commission could still bring suit. On the other hand,
damages could not be recovered even though an inadequate investigation
210. The state of the economy would be an example. See Rogen v. likon Corp., 361
F.2d at 267 (no recovery where opinion related only to state of market for stock).
211. One instance of this would be a prediction of a rise in the price of the Issuer's
stock. The rise would depend on internal factors (such as earnings and potential profits)
and external circumstances (such as the state of the market place in general).
212. Complaint in SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., Civil No. 225-72 (D.D.C.,
filed Feb. 3, 1972), [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ff 93,360, at 91,913
to 91,913-3 (projection of earnings made without disclosing that tentative results showed
a downturn in earnings) ; cf. W. Prosser, Torts § 109, at 726, 728 (4th ed, 1971); Restate-
ment of Torts § 525, comment e, § 539(1) (1938).
213. Complaint in SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., Civil No. 225-72 (D.D.C.,
filed Feb. 3, 1972), [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ff 93,360, at 91,913-
10.
The SEC now proposes to have the underlying assumptions for projections set forth. Re-
lease 9984.
214. Similarly, in Were v. Mack, [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
II 92,956, at 90,523-24 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), the court noted it could be misleading to predict
the market value of preferred stock to be issued in an exchange offer. Moreover, the SEC
proposes to limit the class of issuers who can include projections in prospectuses and proxy
statements to companies with a record or earnings and budgetary controls. Release 9984.
215. Cf. text accompanying notes 48-49 supra.
was conducted if a reasonable investigation would have failed to uncover
the concealed data.216
While the discussion of reasonable basis has been couched in terms of
recommendations to buy or sell a security, the same principles apply to
opinions and estimates of the future status of an event, projections and
predictions of future occurrences, and representations that an event will
take place.21 Those principles are also applicable to two other state-
ments which are in the nature of a recommendation to buy or sell a
security. First, management must have a reasonable basis when it sug-
gests that stockholders approve a merger; tender their shares in a tender
or exchange offer; or buy, sell, or (possibly) hold shares of the issuer.218
216. Cf. Northway, Inc. v. TSC Indus., Inc., [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. ff 93,646, at 92,899 (N.D. IMI 1972) (duty to investigate buyer of control when
on notice of irregularity). However, actions for injunctions or suits by the SEC should be
permitted.
217. Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d at 734 n.8 (can recover for opinions if completely un-
founded and reckless, if deliberately intended to mislead, or if defendant thought them
false when made); Blakely v. Lisac, 357 F. Supp. 255, 262-63 (D. Ore. 1972) (need reason-
able basis for predictions of sales, earnings and use of proceeds); Reube v. Pharmaco-
dynamics, Inc., 348 F. Supp. 900, 915 (ED. Pa. 1972) (predictions of future stock values);
SEC v. American Plan Inv. Corp., [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
1 93,769, at 93,361 (CM). Cal. 1972) (consent order enjoining projections without support) ;
Dolgow v. Anderson, 53 F.R.D. at 670, 676-79; Gordon v. Lipoff, 320 F. Supp. 905, 917
(Wl). Mo. 1970) (quoting Myzel v. Fields, supra); Milberg v. Western Pac. RIR, 51
F.R.D. at 282 (no proof that opinion was reckless when made; therefore, no liability);
Nicewarner v. Bleavins, 244 F. Supp. 261, 264 (D. Colo. 1965) (circumstances made pro-
jections believable by defendant, and projections were made in good faith; therefore, no
cause of action); SEC v. Broadwall Sec., Inc., 240 F. Supp. 962, 968 (S.).N.Y. 1965)
(broker-dealer as defendant); Release 9984; Statement by former SEC Chairman William
J. Casey on Earnings Forecasts and Projections, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. ff 79,211, at 82,666 (Feb. 2, 1973); Alberg, SEC Disclosure Requirements for
Corporations, 26 Bus. Law. 1223, 1229 (1971); see Royal Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith,
312 F.2d 210, 212 (9th Cir. 1962) (misleading estimate of profit which did not take into
account cost of land or mention that mortgage was coming due); Derdiarian v. Futterman
Corp., 38 F.Rl). 178, 179 (Sl).N.Y. 1965) (settlement of class action where basic claim is
concealment of lack of reasonable basis for cash flow projections in prospectuses); d.
AMEX Company Manual § 403(1), at 103 (1970) (prepare projections carefully with a
reasonable factual basis); NYSE Company Manual § A2, at A-22 (1968) (projections
should be soundly based). But see Green v. Jonhop, Inc., 358 F. Supp. at 418-19 ("not
every inaccurate prediction is actionable." Id. at 418; here, grossly inaccurate); Phillips v.
Reynolds & Co, 294 F. Supp. 1249, 1256 (El). Pa.), motion to amend denied, 297 F. Supp.
736 (El). Pa. 1969) (opinion not actionable unless puffing is grossly exaggerated; broker-
dealer is defendant). As to puffing, see note 47 supra and accompanying text.
In Gulf & W. Indus., Inc. v. Great AtL & Pac. Tea Co., 356 F. Supp. at 1070-71, the
court held that management which informed stockholders that it believed a tender offer
price was inadequate did not have to tell the basis for its opinion.
218. Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F2d 787, 803 (2d Cir. 1969), cert.
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Second, it is a common occurrence that, on the basis of data supplied by
the issuer and underwriter of bonds, a bond rating agency will rate bonds
in light of its view of the issuer's credit. The agency should be liable to
investors purchasing bonds on the basis of its rating if it did not conform
to the reasonable-basis rules. It follows that the reasonable investigation
standard for a bond rating agency should be at least as stringent as that
for a broker-dealer.2
1
A statement made with a reasonable basis is not misleading merely
because future events do not bear out the statement. 20 However, if those
future events were reasonably foreseeable, that fact alone should be some
evidence that the original investigation was not sufficiently complete.
Unlike the other statements discussed in this section, opinions and
estimates may relate to a presently existing fact, as well as to a future
status. Present facts can be classified into those which can be ascertained
with reasonable accuracy after a reasonable investigation (such as the
number of items in the inventory of a small business), and those which
cannot be so ascertained (such as the amount of ore in a newly-found
gold mine). An opinion or estimate regarding an ascertainable fact (the
former of the two classes) is the same as a representation of a present
denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970) (reasonable basis found for recommendation in merger); see
Smith v. Newport Nat'l Bank, [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 9 93,200,
at 91,209 (D.R.I. 1971) (recommendations of tender offer by officers and directors; they
acted "honestly and sincerely" and, court indicated, tender offer was fair). Stockholders are
likely to rely heavily on recommendations of management in the midst of a battle for con-
trol, so its advice must be "meticulous and precise." Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft
Corp., 480 F.2d at 364-65.
Somewhat related is the question of the necessity of disclosure by management of better
offers made by the other party to a merger during the negotiating process, when the offers
subsequently were withdrawn, or of items the issuer sought in the bargaining. Stedman v.
Storer, 308 F. Supp. 881, 886-87 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) held that neither must be disclosed.
219. A broker's fiduciary duty to his customers would suggest a higher standard for
brokers, but the resources available to the bond rating agency, the reliance investors place
on their opinions, and the large amounts of money to which the ratings relate Indicate at
least an equal standard for the rating agencies.
A seller using a prime rating on commercial paper when knowing or when he should
know the rating was wrong violates the Rule, regardless of whether there was fraud In
obtaining the rating. SEC v. Crofters, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 236, 255-56 (S.D. Ohio 1972).
220. Dolgow v. Anderson, 53 F.R.D. at 670, 676-79 (intervening cause); Milberg v.
Western Pac. R.R., 51 F.R.D. at 282 (cannot reasonably expect projections to be In-
fallible); Nicewarner v. Bleavins, 244 F. Supp. at 264 (no responsibility for reasonably
cautious predictions); Release 9984; Statement by former SEC Chairman William J. Casey
on Earnings Forecasts and Projections, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
9 79,211, at 82,666 (Feb. 2, 1973); Alberg, supra note 217, at 1229.
In Kutner v. Gofen & Glossberg, [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 1I
93,109 (7th Cir. 1971), the court held that an investment adviser's hope of future return
was not actionable when the return was not achieved. But the adviser should have been
held liable if the hoped-for return was not reasonable when made.
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fact. Therefore, a statement pertaining to ascertainable facts is mislead-
ing if the data are not as represented, even though it is couched in terms
of an estimate or opinion. On the other hand, when the facts cannot be
reasonably ascertained, the speaker nevertheless should have a reason-
able basis for his opinion or estimate and should believe it true, like any
opinion or estimate of a future event.2-
Another type of opinion pertaining to the present is a legal opinion.
The question of when a lawyer's opinion is sufficiently inaccurate to be
misleading has received little attention. 2a Like any other opinion, it
must represent accurately the views of the speaker. One case found an
opinion letter misleading under a modified reasonable-basis standard be-
cause the statements went "enough beyond being mere mistakes in legal
judgment . . . [and hence] constitute[d] probable violations . . . of
the securities laws." 22e This is a less stringent standard than is applied
221. In Felt v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y.
1971) (construing 1933 Act § 11(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1970)), the court rejected a
defense based on the ground that "no one could be certain of precisely how much was in-
volved" and suggested "an honest and open statement, adequately warning of the possibili-
ties of error and miscalculation and not designed for puffing . . . ." Id. at 549.
222. A threshold question is whether a legal conclusion is a "fact". The better reasoned
authorities have resolved this issue affirmatively. SEC v. International Chem. Dev. Corp,
469 F.2d 20, 26 (loth Cir. 1972) (misrepresentation that stocks freely tradeable and
registered); Young v. Taylor, 466 F.2d 1329, 1332 (10th Cir. 1972) (misrepresentation
that stock was registered and misstatement of time stock had to be held before transfer);
Hlrschleifer v. Fran-Tronics Corp., [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCEI Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
93,681, at 93,030 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (misrepresentation of the tax law); Kohner v. Wechsler,
[1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. I 93,537, at 92,564-6S (S.DN.Y.
1972) (alleged misrepresentation in case concerning antitrust and customs laws); Abdelnour
v. Coggeshall & Hicks, [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. U 93,340, at
91,818 & n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (misrepresentation of salability of stock); SEC v. Century
Inv. Transfer Corp., [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. U 93,232, at 91,443
(S.D.N.Y. 1971) (failure to make known the clear statutory necessity of registering stock) ;
Dauphin Corp. v. Sentinel Alarm Corp., 206 F. Supp. 432, 434 (D. Del. 1962); SEC Anti-
fraud Release Regarding Non-Public Offerings, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No.
9444 (Jan. 10, 1972), [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCII Fed. Sec. L. Rep. t 78,483; see
Symington Wayne Corp. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 383 F.2d 840, 843 (2d Cir. 1967) (ques-
tion of tax law; court assumes sub silentio that it is a fact) ; cf. Puma v. Marriott 348 F.
Supp. 18, 22 (D. Del 1972) (proxy rules; concealment that persons can sell some stock
immediately under former 1933 Act Rule 133, 17 C.F.R. § 230.133 (1973), rescinded effective
Jan. 1, 1973, 37 Fed. Reg. 23,636 (1972)); Restatement of Torts § 525, comment c, § 545
(1938). But see Most v. Alleghany Corp., [1969-19"0 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. 1 92,583, at 98,665 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (rarely is a legal opinion a "fact").
223. SEC v. Century Inv. Transfer Corp., [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. ff 93,232, at 91,443 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); cf. SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd. [1972-1973
Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 1 93,631, at 92,867-68 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (not liable
as alder and abettor for giving erroneous opinion absent proof lawyer knew of scheme);
Dauphin Corp. v. Sentinel Alarm Corp., 206 F. Supp. 432 (D. Del. 1962) (denial of mo-
tion for summary judgment) (attorney might be responsible although he claimed there
was no proof his opinion "was given with knowledge it was legally incorrect." Id. at 434).
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to other opinions, and seems to be another manifestation of the "rule"
that everyone is presumed to know the law except attorneys.
A person's valuation of a security for which there is no established
market is still another opinion of existing fact.224 Reliance is often an
element which must be demonstrated in private damage actions. It will
be more difficult to show reliance on an opinion or estimate than on a
statement of fact. And reliance on an opinion of valve might be hardest
to demonstrate,225 since the law generally expects each of the parties to
form his own conclusion on that matter.2
Three issues which relate to publicizing opinions and forecasts remain.
The first concerns a person's obligation to publish an opinion or forecast
before trading. In general, a company need not disclose its internal
projections and opinions concerning its future operations when it trades,
so long as it reveals the underlying material facts.227 (However, the SEC
is now seriously considering whether projections can be placed in pro-
spectuses. 228) An insider or tippee must make the same disclosures as
the corporation if he knows the company's projections or forms his
own based on facts he gathered by virtue of his relationship to the
company. 29 But the insider or outsider who reaches a conclusion regard-
ing the future from publicly known facts need make no disclosure when
he trades. Second, to keep investors informed, publicized projections of
future results must be updated promptly after the issuer revises its esti-
224. See Note, Purchaser's Duty to Disclose Under Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion Rule X-10B-5, 40 Minn. L. Rev. 62, 68 (1955).
225. This explains the result in Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d at 736; Chiodo v. General
Waterworks Corp., 380 F.2d at 867; Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, 353 F. Supp. 795, 798
(W.D. Pa. 1973); Gordon v. Lipoff, 320 F. Supp. 905, 915 (W.D. Mo. 1970). In all cases,
the speaker was less familiar, or equally familiar, with the company than the listener.
226. See Gulf & W. Indus., Inc. v. Great Ati. & Pac. Tea Co., 356 F. Supp. at
1071 (price of a stock determined partly by hunches of the market; therefore, adequacy or
inadequacy of tender offer price is subjective and so should not condemn opinion of target
company for inadequacy); cf. IV. Prosser, Torts § 109, at 723-24, 726-28 (4th ed. 1971)
(common law); Restatement of Torts § 543, comment f (1938).
As to whether an implied representation arises that a price quoted is fair, see notes 188,
196 supra and accompanying text.
227. 37 Fordham L. Rev. 483, 489 (1969), discussing the Second Circuit opinion in
Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc). On the other side of the
coin, the projection based on the inside information may not be disclosed selectively.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No.
8459 (Nov. 25, 1968), [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 11 77,629 (re-
spondent's statement of policy). See cases cited in note 217 supra.
228. Release 9984.
229. See Jackson v. Oppenhein, [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. II
93,001, at 90,696 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (indicating that an insider's opinion may not have to
be disclosed but his facts must be revealed).
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mates&"° Third, the issuer is precluded from disseminating statements
regarding the future when it is in the process of registration.23'
IV. DiscLosuRE AMD CURING
In the proper situation, a defendant might be able to sever the causal
connection between his fraudulent activity and plaintiff's injury by dis-
closing the facts. Full disclosure might be defined as proper dissemina-
tion of a statement which conveys the true state of affairs to a reasonable
investor 3 2 Passive behavior is not enough. Thus, mere readiness and
willingness to disclose is ineffectual.' And despite some early views to
the contrary,m4 the availability of information from corporate books (at
least where the plaintiff is not an insider) and an offer to answer questions
are likewise inadequate.2 Similarly, the Third Circuit has held that in
a proxy contest, defects in one party's proxy material cannot be cured
by disclosures in the other party's soliciting material."' This result
should be limited to proxy statements and registration statements which
ought to be self-contained. In general, however, information can be
disclosed by anyone as long as it becomes public knowledge.23
230. Dayan, supra note 88, at 944 (must correct); see NYSE Company Manual § A2, at
A-18, A-23 (1968) (correction required of rumors, etc.). One of the factors one court used
to exonerate a corporation whose estimates turned out to be incorrect was that it reported
supervening events and changes in predictions. Dolgow v. Anderson 53 F.R.D. at 677-79.
The SEC would require updating of projections and reasons for deviations between pro-
jected and actual results. Release 9984.
231. Guidelines for the Release of Information by Issuers Whose Securities Are in
Registration, SEC Securities Act Release No. 5180 (Aug. 16, 1971), [1970-1971 Transfer
Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. f 78,192.
232. This is patterned after the definition of a misrepresentation. See note 12 supra
and accompanying text.
233. Stier v. Smith, 473 F.2d 1205, 1208 (5th Cir. 1973); Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d at
735, citing Dale v. Rosenfeld, 229 F.2d 855, 858 (2d Cir. 1956); Hughes v. SEC, 174 F.2d
969, 976 (D.C. Cir. 1949); Bowman & Bourdon, Inc. v. Rohr, 296 F. Supp. 847, 851 (D.
Mass.), aff'd per curiam, 417 F.2d 780 (Ist Cir. 1969); Masland, Fernon & Anderson, 9
S.E.C. 338, 347 (1941).
234. E.g., Mills v. Sarjem Corp., 133 F. Supp. at 766 (offer to give information).
235. Stier v. Smith, 473 F.2d 1205, 1208 (5th Cir. 1973); Associated Investors Sec,
Inc., 41 S.E.C. 160, 167 (1962); cf. Jackson v. Oppenheim, (1970-1971 Transfer Binder]
CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. II 93,001, at 90,696 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
236. Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d at 265. But see id. at 290-91 n.47
(concurring and dissenting opinion) (this rule is correct for proxy violations but not for
violations of lob-5). See also Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341,
365 (2d Cir. 1973) (disclosure and curing in prospectus and letters). Compare Chris-Craft
Indus., Inc. v. Independent Stockholders Comm., [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. 11 93,766, at 93,351 (D. Del. 1973) (proxy rules; insufficient to make dis-
closure in annual report and not in proxy statement unless proxy statement dearly refers
to annual report).
237. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d at 377 (misrepresenta-
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The method of disclosure is also important. The controlling issue is
whether the information is received by the persons to whom it is directed.
Facts can be revealed to one person or a small group either by telephone,
by delivery of a written statement, or during a face-to-face meeting. Dis-
closure to the public would be governed by the standards developed for
determining whether a press release or other material is sufficiently dis-
seminated.ss This rule is subject to one qualification-the public should
not be presumed to have knowledge of information disseminated to cor-
rect previously circulated data unless the correcting release is given at
least as extensive publicity as the misleading announcement.2
8
The effect of properly disseminated, understandable disclosure depends
upon whether or not the 10b-5 violation was substantive. Substantive
breaches would include, for example, certain types of mismanagement of
a corporation or manipulation of a market, and are to be distinguished
from violations arising only from a misstatement or omission. Disclosure
cannot cure substantive violations.240 Even when the only breach of the
Rule is a misleading statement or omission, a comprehensible corrective
announcement will preclude a damage action 41 only if the recipients have
not acted or were not irrevocably committed to act 242 when they absorbed
tion in letters by management cured by letters of one of two suitors); id, at 401 (con-
curring and dissenting opinion).
238. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 854.
239. For an example of a suit brought by the Commission based on a false annual re-
port to stockholders see SEC v. First Standard Corp., [1966-1967 Transfer Binder] CCH
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ff 91,824 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). The court required the corporation to send
the "clarifying" release to all persons who received the report and to specified newspapers.
Id. at 95,836. See also Rosenblatt v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 435 F.2d 1121, 1128 (2d Cir.
1970) (failure to disclose great losses one year before proxy statement is remedied by
placing losses in proxy statement).
240. This is evidenced further by other antifraud rules which are violated even though
disclosure is made. See, e.g., 1934 Act Rules 10b-6 and 15cl-7, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.10b-6,
240.15c1-7 (1973).
241. There is some indication that disclosure does not cure even a non-substantive vio-
lation. See Associated Investors Sec., Inc., 41 S.E.C. 160, 167 (1962) (offer to refund price
with interest no defense); cf. SEC v. Great Am. Indus., Inc., 407 F.2d 453, 457 (2d Cir.
1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 920 (1969) (apparently under 1934 Act § 13(a), 15
U.S.C. § 78m(a) (1970)). This apparent discrepancy can be explained by treating a proper,
timely correction as precluding a damage action since no injury can be shown.
242. Moerman v. Zipco, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 439, 443 (E.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd per curlam,
422 F.2d 871 (2d Cir. 1970); Note, Purchaser's Duty to Disclose Under Securities and
Exchange Commission Rule X-10B-5, 40 Minn. L. Rev. 62, 73 (1955); see Chris-Craft
Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d at 363 (earlier promise of value of securities
would not influence rational investor who received prospectus containing details); Slavin
v. Germantown Fire Ins. Co., 174 F.2d 799, 813 (3d Cir. 1949) (dissenting opinion). See
also SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 312 F. Supp. at 84 (no need to wait for promised
clarification). Compare Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Independent Stockholders Comm., [1972-
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and evaluated the data contained in the announcement. 43 Some schemes
raise such serious 10b-5 questions that it is doubtful whether meaningful
disclosure can be made.2" Assuming the correction is intelligible and
timely, the burden of taking affirmative action can be shifted to voting or
tendering stockholders by requiring them to change their vote or with-
draw their securities if they so desire.2 41
A few miscellaneous points remain. First, disclosure in mismanagement
situations is somewhat complex. 4 Second, a correction of a statement is
itself some evidence that the statement was misleading when issued,
particularly if no development intervened between the two announce-
ments.247 Third, the change in market price after a correcting release
can be used as evidence of the misleading nature of the prior state-
ment.24 18 Fourth, the Second Circuit held that it is no defense in an action
1973 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 1 93,766, at 93,348 (D. Del. 1973) (proxy
rules; informed stockholders as soon as facts were learned); deHaas v. Empire Petroleum
Co., 300 F. Supp. 834, 836 n.2 (D. Colo. 1969), modified, 435 F.2d 1223 (10th Cir. 1970)
(letter over one month later permissible to correct misleading first letter in proxy material;
no discussion of status of votes received in intervening period).
243. But see Derdiarian v. Futterman Corp., 38 F.R.D. 178, 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (set-
tlement of class action for misleading statement; class terminates on date of issuance of
correcting announcement).
244. Jerry W. Smith, SEC No-action letter (lay 16, 1972), [1972-1973 Transfer
Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 11 78,856 (hypothetical portfolio cannot be meaningful
measure of performance as investment advisor); Ferris & Co., SEC No-action letter (Apr.
24, 1972), [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ff 78,903 (same); Pro-
gressive Phone Systems, Inc., SEC No-action letter (June 30, 1971), [1971-1972 Transfer
Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ff 78,361 (manipulation); Edmund C. Mead, SEC No-
action letter (June 18, 1971), [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. U
78,323 (investment advisory fee if open accounts at named broker-dealer); Argus Sec. Mgt.
Corp., SEC No-action letter (June 1, 1971), [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. 78,366 (advisor to customer's broker); Reinholdt & Gardner, SEC No-action
letter (Mfar. 25, 1971), [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. U 78,120
(broker-dealers). Query whether this concept is limited to substantive violations?
245. Abramson v. Nytronics, Inc., 312 F. Supp. 519, 526 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (original
proxy statement gave clear and fair presentation of facts). In Electronic Specialty Co. v.
International Controls Corp., 295 F. Supp. at 1072-73, the court approved a withdrawal
offer made by a tenderer to stockholders who had tendered. The offer was timely, con-
tained a complete description of the litigation which was in progress, and extended the
stockholders a reasonable time in which to act. In the court's view, this cured the defen-
dant's violation. Accord, Nicholson File Co. v. H.K. Porter Co., 341 F. Supp. S03, 521
(D.R.I. 1972), aff'd, 482 F.2d 421 (1st Cir. 1973) (tender offer provisions); Hirschleifer v.
Fran-Tronics Corp., [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ff 93,681, at
93,030 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
246. See generally Jacobs, supra note 5, at 51-61, 67-75.
247. SEC v. Great Am. Indus., Inc., 407 F.2d at 457. But see Nicholson File Co. v. H.K.
Porter Co., 341 F. Supp. at 521. It is also subjective evidence of materiality.
248. See notes 53-54 supra and accompanying text.
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by the Commission that an erroneous 8-K report was corrected before
it was placed in the public files; 24 9 but the court noted that inadvertence
in preparing the original filing and prompt correction after request "may
affect liability for damages .... ,25o Fifth, a successful suit cannot be
precluded by stating in a misleading release that clarification will be
issued later.251 Indeed, a cause of action could arise out of the confusion
of the two announcements if the "clarifying" release is significantly
different in content but closely related in time.202 Finally, selective
disclosure constitutes tipping when the data are material. The New York
Stock Exchange prohibits selective disclosure of even non-material





This article has attempted to explain what may constitute a misleading
statement or omission under Rule 10b-5. It should be obvious from an
examination of the authorities cited that courts will differ on the question
of whether a particular statement violates the Rule. The topic is far from
settled, and so prediction is impossible, if not foolhardy. But patterns are
discernable, and this article has pointed out some of them. What lies in
the future depends on whether the courts continue to construe the Rule
as broadly as they have in the past; if so, the scope of misleading state-
ments may very well encompass statements heretofore thought immune.
249. SEC v. Great Am. Indus., Inc., 407 F.2d at 457 (seemingly discussing 1934 Act §
13(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (1970)).
250. Id. at 457.
251. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 312 F. Supp. at 84.
252. See Reynolds v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 309 F. Supp. at 561-62.
253. NYSE Company Manual § A2, at A-20 (1968).
254. Compare Bromberg, Corporate Information: Texas Gulf Sulphur and Its Im-
plications, 22 Sw. L.J. 731, 752 (1968).
